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Sarah P. Bradley* Unlimited Liability in the Modern Context:
An Examination of Shareholder Liability in
Nova Scotia Unlimited Liability Companies
For over 30 years, unlimited liability companies have been ubiquitous in US-
Canadian M&A transactions. Typically interposed between a US parent company
and a Canadian operating company, these entities quietly function to make such
structures more tax efficient. They are facilitated by Nova Scotia's venerable
Companies Act, which has allowed for the incorporation of corporations with
unlimited liability for over a hundred years. Unlimited liability of shareholders is
the singular defining characteristic of the ULC, but the precise nature of ULC
shareholder liability was apparently regarded as something of a technicality
and rarely, if ever, closely examined in the professional or academic literature or
considered by the courts. Perhaps unlimited liability was considered too familiar
a concept to require detailed analysis, or perhaps it was considered irrelevant
in practice because the debts of modern ULCs are typically guaranteed by
their parent companies. In such a structure, the liability of the parent company
seems clear This apparent clarity proved illusory, however, following the recent
financial crisis, when a number of ULC parent companies faced bankruptcy and
restructuring and the precise nature of their unlimited liability was suddenly the
subject of intense scrutiny and conflict.
Depuis plus de 30 ans, les soci6t6s a responsabilite illimitee (SRI) ont 6t6
omnipresentes dans les transactions de fusions et acquisitions -. -U.-Canada.
Souvent interposees entre une soci6td mare am6ricaine et une socite d'exploitation
canadienne, ces entites sont des acteurs silencieux qui font que ces structures sont
efficientes sur le plan de la fiscalite. Elles peuvent 6tre constituees sous le regime
de la v6n6rable Companies Act de la Nouvelle-Ecosse qui depuis plus de cent
ans pr6voit la constitution de societds a responsabilit6 illimitee. La responsabilite
illimitee des actionnaires est la caracteristique singuli6re qui definit les SRI, mais
la nature pr6cise de la responsabilit6 de leurs actionnaires 6tait apparemment
consideree comme un simple point technique et rarement examin6e de pros, si
tant est qu'elle I'ait jamais ete, dans les documents professionnels universitaires
ou m~me 6tudiee par les tribunaux. Peut-6tre la responsabiit6 illimit6e etait-elle
consideree comme dtant un concept trop bien connu pour justifier une analyse
detaillee, ou peut-6tre 6tait-elle consid6r6e comme n'dtant pas pertinente en
pratique parce que les dettes des SRI modernes sont habituellement garanties
par leurs societ6s mares. Dans une telle structure, la responsabilite de la soci6te
mare semble claire. Cette clarte apparente sest cependant r6v6lde illusoire lors
de la r6cente crise financiere, alors que les soci6t6s meres de nombreuses SRI
ont et6 accul6es J la faillite eta! la restructuration et que la nature exacte de leur
responsabilit6 illimitee a soudainement fait l'objet d'un examen rigoureux et de
conflits.
* Associate Professor, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia.
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Introduction
It has been possible to incorporate companies with unlimited shareholder
liability in Nova Scotia for more than a hundred years, but for most of
the twentieth century, such companies were as unheard of in Nova Scotia
as they were everywhere else. They existed only as anachronisms in the
outdated sections of the infrequently amended Nova Scotia Companies
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Act'-legal relics of a bygone era that had yet to be erased completely
through the process of statutory reform. Then, in the 1990s, thanks to
the evolution of U.S. tax laws and the pioneering work of a few Nova
Scotia lawyers,2 Nova Scotia unlimited liability companies (NSULCs)
experienced a dramatic and sustained burst of popularity, becoming more
frequently used than they had ever previously been, and for many years,
NSULCs were used in the structuring of virtually every U.S.-Canada
cross-border acquisition.
The key to this sudden popularity was the NSULC's singular defining
characteristic: unlimited shareholder liability.3 The possibility of unlimited
1. Companies Act, RSNS 1989, c 81 [NSCA].
2. The watershed moment for the modem ULC occurred in 1988, with US, IRS Revenue Ruling
88-8, 1988-1 CB 403, in which the IRS concluded that a British ULC should be classified for
federal tax purposes as a partnership on the basis of Regulations 301.7701-2 (26 CFR § 301.7701-2
(2014)), because it had associates and possessed an objective to carry on business and divide the
gains therefrom, but lacked the corporate characteristics of limited liability and free transferability of
interests. See "Important Developments During the Year: Administrative Practice" (1989) 42:4 Tax
Lawyer 1103. Previously, the IRS had concluded in a private letter ruling that a foreign ULC would
be treated as a "corporation 'per se"' (US, Internal Revenue Service, PLR 8426031, 26 March 1984;
for discussion, see Robert Thornton Smith, "Substance and Form: A Taxpayers Right to Assert the
Priority of Substance" (1990) 44:1 Tax Lawyer 137).
This decision was soon followed by an article published in the International Tax Journal (Walter
F O'Connor, "Using a UK Unlimited Liability Company in US Tax Planning" (1989-1990) 16:1 Intl
Tax J 54). For a more detailed analysis, see also Thomas R Bretz & Steven White, "Cross-Border
Placement/Movement of Indebtedness and Tax-Effective Use of Cash Accumulated Offshore" (1990)
68:12 Taxes: Tax Magazine 1103.
In 1991, the IRS took a further step by concluding that a British ULC would be treated as a
partnership for US Federal tax purposes despite being owned by a I st and 2nd tier subsidiary of a US
company, provided it did not have the hallmark "corporate characteristics" outlined in Regs 301.7701-
2 (26 CFR § 301.7701-2 (20 14)). This marked a departure from the IRS's previous position on "single
economic theory" (for discussion see David R Ryder, Lowell D Yoder & Sandra P McGill, "Beneficial
Uses of Foreign Entities and Structures in Tax Planning for the US Multinational Company" (1992)
70:12 Taxes: Tax Magazine 1021.
In 1995 the IRS issued a private letter ruling concluding specifically that an NSULC may qualify
as a partnership under US law (US, Internal Revenue Service, PLR 9538020, 22 June 1995). This was
followed in 1996 by the introduction of "check the box" regulations, giving US taxpayers the ability to
simply select flow-through tax status for certain single-member entities, including NSULCs (26 CFR
§ 301.7701-3 (2015)) (for a general discussion see Joel Rabinovitz & Eric M Zolt, "Tax Nothings"
(1997) 75:12 Taxes: Tax Magazine 869.
The first publication relating to the use of NSULCs in US tax planning was a brief article in
the American Bar Association's Section of Taxation newsletter: J Gerald Godsoe, "A Flow-through
Hybrid: Nova Scotia Unlimited Liability Companies" (Fall 1995) 15:1 Newsletter ABA Section
Taxation 5. This was followed by more detailed articles, such as: Paul W Festeryga, "Nova Scotia
Unlimited Liability Companies: What Are They and How Do They Work?" in Report of Proceedings
of the Fiftieth Tax Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1999) 17:1, and Barry D Home,
"The Nova Scotia Unlimited Liability Company: Surf and Turf' in Report ofProceedings of the Fifty-
seventh Tax Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2006) 26:1.
3. In the NSCA, supra note 1, s 135, the term "member" is used. Member is a somewhat broader
term than "shareholder" because it is possible to be a member of an NSCA company without owning
shares. All shareholders are members, however, and every provision in the Act applying to members
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liability allowed for the creation of an entity considered a corporation under
Canadian law that could be treated as a partnership for U.S. tax purposes.
Although this advantage has been somewhat diminished recently due to
U.S. tax law reforms, for over 20 years it provided a significant incentive
to incorporate NSULCs under the NSCA and over 7780 were formed
between 1990 and 2013.'
The unlimited nature of the liability borne by the shareholders of an
NSULC was apparently regarded as something of a technicality that was
rarely, if ever, addressed in detail. The precise nature of that liability was
not closely examined in the professional or academic literature, and until
recently was never considered by the courts. Perhaps unlimited liability
was considered too familiar a concept to require detailed analysis, or
perhaps it was considered irrelevant in practice because modem NSULCs
are typically used in very close corporate structures, usually as wholly-
owned subsidiaries with clearly defined assets and liabilities and with debts
guaranteed by their parent companies. In such a structure, the liability of
the parent company seems clear. This apparent clarity proved illusory,
however, following the recent financial crisis, when a number of NSULC
parent companies faced bankruptcy and restructuring and the precise
nature of their unlimited liability was suddenly cast into the spotlight.
The principal bankruptcy proceedings for these large NSULC parent
companies have typically been heard by the United States Bankruptcy
Court in New York and Delaware, with related actions in Canadian courts.
As discussed below, most of these cases have been settled by the parties
before the courts had an opportunity to comment directly on the issue of
NSULC shareholder liability. As a result, despite its recent relevance, the
specific contours of NSULC shareholder liability have yet to be judicially
considered. Nevertheless, these cases highlight the importance of the issue
and the gap in the existing literature and jurisprudence, and they provide
an interesting basis for closer examination.
The recent Delaware cases have all involved similar fact patterns
with respect to NSULC shareholder liability. Fundamentally, each case
has involved a wholly-owned NSULC subsidiary that had issued debt
instruments which were guaranteed by its parent. Upon the bankruptcy of
the parent company, the holders of the NSULC's debt instruments asserted
what are sometimes referred to as "double-dip" claims-one claim is made
applies to shareholders. Accordingly, I will use the more familiar term "shareholder" throughout this
paper.
4. Data received from the Nova Scotia Registry of Joint Stock Companies. Formations include
incorporations, amalgamations or conversions upon continuance or memorandum alteration.
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by the holders of the debt instruments (through the indenture trustee) against
the NSULC's parent on the basis of its liability as a guarantor (referred to
in this paper as a "guarantee claim"), while a concurrent claim is made by
the NSULC (through its liquidator or trustee) against the parent company
on the basis of the parent's unlimited liability as a shareholder pursuant
to section 135 of the NSCA5 (referred to in this paper as a "contribution
claim"). This incremental claim asserted by the'NSULC has the potential
to enhance the recoveries of all of the NSULC's creditors, over and above
what has been recovered by the parent company's creditors directly.
In each case, the holders of the NSULC's debt instruments have
asserted that the guarantee claim and the contribution claim are distinct
from one another and that both are separate obligations of the parent, while
the parent company and the parent company's other creditors have argued
that because these claims arise from the same originating transaction, and
because they are both in substance owed to the same creditor, they cannot
both be valid under the NSCA and should be disallowed as duplicative
under bankruptcy law and the common law rule against double proof.
5. In its entirety, section 135 reads:
In the event of a company being wound up, every present and past member shall, subject
to this Section, be liable to contribute to the assets of the company to an amount sufficient
for payment of its debts and liabilities and the costs, charges, and expenses of the winding
up and for the adjustments of the rights of the contributories among themselves, with the
qualifications following:
(a) a past member shall not be liable to contribute if he has ceased to be a member for one
year or upwards before the commencement of the winding up;
(b) a past member shall not be liable to contribute in respect of any debt or liability of the
company contracted after he ceased to be a member;
(c) a past member shall not be liable to contribute unless it appears to the court that the
existing members are unable to satisfy the contributions required to be made by them in
pursuance of this Act;
(d) in the case of a company limited by shares, no contribution shall be required from any
member exceeding the amount, if any, unpaid on the shares in respect of which he is
liable as a present or past member;
(e) in the case of a company limited by guarantee, no contribution shall be required from
any member exceeding the amount undertaken to be contributed by him to the assets of
the company in the event of its being wound up;
(ea) in the case of an unlimited company, no contribution exceeding the amount, if any,
unpaid on the shares in respect of which the member is liable as a past member, shall be
required from a past member who was not a member of the company at any time on or
after the time the company became unlimited;
(f) nothing in this Act shall invalidate any provision contained in any contract whereby the
liability of the individual members of the contract is restricted, or whereby the funds of
the company are alone made liable in respect of the policy or contract;
(g) a sum due to any member of a company, in his character of a member, by way of
dividends, profits or otherwise, shall not be deemed to be a debt of the company, payable
to that member in a case of competition between himself and any other creditor not a
member of the company, but any such sum may be taken into account for the purpose of
the final adjustment of the rights of the contributories among themselves.
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In Part I of this paper, I introduce these recent cases, and the issue
of NSULC shareholder liability in the circumstances in which modem
NSULCs have typically been used. In Part II, I discuss the issues of Nova
Scotia corporate law raised by the recent cases, including the history,
context and purpose relevant to the interpretation of section 135 and
some of the arguments put forward by the litigants in these cases, and
demonstrate that as a matter of Nova Scotia law, the fact that a parent
company has guaranteed the debts of a subsidiary NSULC does not change
the nature of its obligation as a contributory under section 135 unless the
debt instrument specifically excludes such contributory liability. In some
cases, this means that a contribution claim can validly be made under the
NSCA against a parent company in relation to debt issued by a subsidiary
NSULC, despite the fact that the parent is also liable for this debt pursuant
to a guarantee.
Because winding up is a fundamental requirement for shareholder
liability under the NSCA, in Part III I discuss the meaning and nature of
winding up under the NSCA in the modem context. In Part IV, I canvass
the bankruptcy law issues raised by the litigants relating to the single
satisfaction rule and the doctrine of equitable consolidation in the United
States and the rule against double proof and the piercing of the corporate
veil in Canada, as well as the question of which set of laws will be most
relevant in determining these bankruptcy law issues. I demonstrate that
in most modem NSULC cases, questions as to whether the claims are
duplicative and the underlying corporate structure should be disregarded
will be determined principally by U.S. law, where numerous cases have
allowed double recovery in circumstances quite similar to the fact patterns
presented by the modem NSULC cases, with the caveat that no creditor
can ever recover more than 100 per cent of the underlying debt.
I. Recent cases and issues
The first of the cases that raised the issue of the potential double liability
of ULC shareholder-guarantors was the bankruptcy of General Motors. 6
Starting in 2006, as GM's financial position worsened and its debt was
deeply discounted, hedge funds began buying up bonds that had been
issued by an NSULC wholly owned by GM's Canadian subsidiary. The
funds had targeted this debt strategically on the basis of their assessment
of GM Canada's concurrent liability as both guarantor and an NSULC
shareholder. By the time of GM's bankruptcy proceedings in 2009, four
6. The GM Chapter 11 case is In re Motors Liquidation Co, 09-50026-reg (Bankr SDNY 2010),
online: <www.nysb.uscourts.gov>.
Unlimited Liability in the Modern Context: An Examination 75
of Shareholder Liability in Nova Scotia ULCs
hedge funds had acquired more than two-thirds of the NSULC's $1.07
billion in outstanding bonds for pennies on the dollar.
The Canadian subsidiary of GM was just one part of a larger
restructuring of its U.S. parent and as the bankruptcy deadline drew
near, GM and GM Canada were under immense pressure to settle with
the NSULC noteholders or see the entire restructuring collapse. In these
circumstances, at the eleventh hour, the NSULC noteholders were able
to leverage their contribution claim arguments strategically to achieve a
settlement that granted them recovery on their notes of $367 million in
cash and $2.67 billion in claims for shares-almost triple the recovery of
GM's other unsecured creditors.7 This settlement was challenged by GM's
other unsecured creditors in a lawsuit filed in 2012 in the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court in Manhattan! The unsecured GM creditors alleged that the Nova
Scotia noteholders' conduct in the settlement negotiations was wrongful
and damaging to other creditors' recoveries. This case was ultimately
settled in 2013 and the claim of the NSULC noteholders was reduced to
$1.55 billion, giving them approximately 1.8 times the recovery of the
other creditors.9 Both settlements were strategic, however, and the issue
of the NSULC shareholder's liability as a contributory, though vigorously
argued, was never decided or conceded.
The Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings of Smurfit-Stone Container
Corporation were commenced in 2009 and presented a similar fact pattern
involving an NSULC finance subsidiary.'0 In Smurfit-Stone, however, the
debt instruments in question were notes issued pursuant to an indenture
that included a specific provision that the noteholders would have:
No recourse for the payment of the principal of, premium, if any, or
interest.., in respect of any of the Notes, or for any claim based thereon
or otherwise in respect thereof, and no recourse under or upon any
obligation, covenant or agreement of [the ULC] ... shall be had against any
incorporator or against any past, present or future partner, stockholder,
other equityholder, officer, director, employee or controlling person,
7. In re 12-09802-reg Motors Liquidation Co GUC Trust v Appaloosa Investment LP I, 12-09802
(Bankr SDNY 2012) (Complaint against Appaloosa Investment LP I, Doc 11476 filed 1 March 2012),
online: <www.motorsliquidationdocket.com/pdflib/I 1476_50026.pdf>.
8. In re Motors Liquidation Co GUC Trust v Appaloosa Investment LP 1, 12-09802 (Bankr SDNY
2012), online <www.nysb.uscourts.gov>.
9. In re 12-09802 Motors Liquidation Co GUC v Appoloosa Investment LP 1, 12-09802 (Bankr
SDNY 2012) (Order Approving the Global Settlement Agreement by and Among the GUC Trust,
the GUC Trust Monitor, the Nova Scotia Trustee, New GM,. GM Canada, and the Representative
Noteholders, Doc 12531 signed 21 October 2013), online: <www.motorsliquidationdocket.com/
pdflib/1253 1_50026.pdf>.
10. In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corporation, 09-10235 (Bankr Del 10 January 2011), online:
<www.deb.uscourts.gov> [Smurfit-Stone].
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as such, of [the ULC].. .whether by virtue of any constitution, statute
or rule of law, or by the enforcement of any assessment or penalty or
otherwise; it being expressly understood that all such liability is hereby
expressly waived and released as a condition of, and as a consideration
for, the execution of this Indenture and the issue of the Notes."
The Court held that this "no recourse" provision prevented the noteholders
from pursuing any claim for contributory liability against the ULC
shareholders due to the application of Section 135(f) of the NSCA. 12
Another similar scenario unfolded in the bankruptcy ofAbitibiBowater
Inc.,'13 and in that case, the indenture did not contain a "no recourse"
provision such as the one seen in Smurfit-Stone. This placed the issue of the
parent company's liability as both a guarantor and an NSULC shareholder
squarely at issue. The issue was vigorously argued before the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware and the Quebec Superior
Court in the related Canadian Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act 4
proceedings, but the case was settled before any judicial determination
was made. 5
Given the prevalence of NSULC finance subsidiaries in cross-border
structures, these cases present questions of both practical and academic
interest relating to both Nova Scotia corporate law and fundamental
principles of Canadian and U.S. bankruptcy law. The corporate law issue
calls for an analysis of the interpretation of section 135 and nature of the
liability of NSULC shareholders to determine whether the existence of a
guarantee by an NSULC shareholder should preclude concurrent liability
as a contributor for the company's liabilities. The bankruptcy law issues
relate to the question of whether the single satisfaction rule (in the United
States) or the common law rule against double proof (in Canada) apply to
prevent the recovery of both a guarantee claim and a contribution claim
against an NSULC parent company guarantor.
II. Nova Scotia corporate law issues
The fundamental corporate law question raised by these recent cases is
whether Nova Scotia corporate law requires or permits contributory
11. Ibid at 4-5 [emphasis omitted].
12. Section 135(f) provides: "[N]othing in this Act shall invalidate any provision contained in any
contract whereby the liability of the individual members of the contract is restricted, or whereby the
funds of the company are alone made liable in respect of the policy or contract."
13. In re Abitibi Bowater 09-11296 (Bankr Del 2011), online: <www.deb.uscourts.gov>
[AbitibiBowater].
14. Companies'Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-36 [CCAA].
15. I acted as an expert consultant to the noteholders in AbitibiBowater, supra note 13.
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liability on winding up to be reduced or eliminated if a sole shareholder
has made or agreed to make a partial payment of the NSULC's debt.
This fundamental question raises three sub-issues, all of which were
argued by the litigants in the modem NSULC cases, and all of which are
based in the statutory interpretation of section 135. The interpretation of
section 135 requires an analysis of the history, context and purpose of
the section, which are canvassed below. The sub-issues relevant to the
question of whether contributory liability should be reduced or eliminated
in the modem NSULC context are:
1. whether section 135 allows for any limitation of NSULC
shareholder liability other than as explicitly provided for in that
section;
2. whether a shareholder guarantee of an NSULC's debt precludes
concurrent liability as a contributory; and
3. whether the principles of partnership liability apply to the
unlimited liability of NSULC shareholders.
Each of these issues is discussed in detail below.
1. Interpretation of section 135: History, context and purpose
Section 135 of the NSCA is the basis for contributory liability for NSULC
shareholders. The relevant portions of this provision, in the modem
NSULC context, stipulate that in the event of an NSULC "being wound
up,"'16 its shareholder is liable to contribute to the assets of the company to
an amount sufficient for payment of its debts and liabilities and the costs,
charges, and expenses of the winding up. There are eight enumerated
"qualifications" on this liability, with the only relevant one in this context
set out in clause 135(f), which stipulates that contributory liability is
subject to any contractual agreement specifically limiting it with respect
to a particular debt. Clause 135(f) was pivotal in excluding contributory
liability of the parent company in the Smurfit-Stone case, as discussed
above.
Because NSULC shareholder liability arises directly and exclusively
from section 135, understanding the precise nature of this liability is,
.first and foremost, an exercise in statutory interpretation, which requires
consideration of the "modem principle" formulated by Elmer Driedger
in the second edition of his book Construction of Statutes, in which he
asserts:
16. The nature of "being wound up" is the subject of Part III of this paper.
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Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an
Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and
ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of
the Act, and the intention of Parliament. 7
This enunciation of the modem principle has been frequently cited
and relied upon by Canadian courts of all levels and is unquestionably at
the foundation of any Canadian statutory analysis. 8 However, Driedger's
modem principle is far from a simplistic formula. It is composed of a
number of elements, requiring an analysis of a statute's "entire context,"
the plain meaning of its words, its scheme and object, and the intention
of Parliament in enacting it. The Supreme Court of Canada has observed,
however, that "this framework need not be applied in a formulaic manner.
The factors need not be canvassed separately in every case, given that they
are very closely related and interdependent."' 9
For Driedger, the 'entire context" of a statute includes its internal
context as well as its external context, consisting of the statute book as a
whole and the body of law as a whole, as well as the statute's intellectual,
social and legal contexts. The "grammatical and ordinary sense" of
the words is the meaning that would be understood immediately by an
ordinary reader.20
The modem principle has been referred to as an "intentionalist"
approach to statutory interpretation, in that its purpose is to discover and
implement the intention of the enacting legislature. For Driedger, the
intention of Parliament consistedof four elements: Parliament's expressed
intention, its implied intention, its presumed intention and its declared
intention. However, it has been observed that the Supreme Court of Canada
has been somewhat inconsistent on this point and at times has not delved
17. EA Driedger, Construction ofStatutes, 2nd ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at 87. This framing
of the modem principle was altered by Driedger in subsequent editions of his book, and these latter
articulations have not been as readily accepted by the courts, though Ruth Sullivan has argued that
they are not substantively different. See Ruth Sullivan, "Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court
of Canada" (1999) 30:2 Ottawa L Rev 175 at 219.
18. See: Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27 at para 21; Bell ExpressVu LP v Rex, 2002
SCC 42 at para 26, [2002] 2 SCR 559; HL v Canada (AG), 2005 SCC 25 at paras 186-187, [2005] 1
SCR 401; Marche v Halifax Insurance Co, 2005 SCC 6 at para 54, [2005] 1 SCR 47; Harvard College
v Canada (Commissioner of Patents), 2002 SCC 76 at para 154, [2002] 4 SCR 45; Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co v Canada (AG), 2005 SCC 26 at para 96, [2005] 1 SCR 533 [Bristol-Myers]; R v Middleton,
2009 SCC 21 at para 154, [2009] 1 SCR 674. For detailed discussion, see Sullivan, supra note 17.
19. Bristol-Myers, supra note 18 at para 96, citing Chieu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2002 SCC 3 at para 28, [2002] 1 SCR 84.
20. Sullivan, supra note 17 at 216.
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very deeply into the intention of Parliament, preferring instead to treat the
modem principle as "'plain meaning in a substantive sense."' 2'
Driedger also set out steps of construction, which have been cited
with approval by the Supreme Court of Canada, referring to the modem
principle as the "'contextual approach"':
1. The Act as a whole is to be read in its entire context so as to ascertain
the intention of Parliament (the law as expressly or impliedly
enacted by the words), the object of the Act (the ends sought to
be achieved), and the scheme of the Act (the relation between the
individual provisions of the Act).
2. The words of the individual provisions to be applied to the particular
case under consideration are then to be read in their grammatical and
ordinary sense in the light of the intention of Parliament embodied
in the Act as a whole, the object of the Act and the scheme of the
Act, and if they are clear and unambiguous and in harmony with that
intention, object and scheme and with the general body of the law,
that is the end.
3. If the words are apparently obscure or ambiguous, then a meaning
that best accords with the intention of Parliament, the object of the
Act and the scheme of the Act, but one that the words are reasonably
capable of bearing, is to be given them.
4. If, notwithstanding that the words are clear and unambiguous when
read in their grammatical and ordinary sense, there is disharmony
within the statute, statutes in pari materia, or the general law, then
an unordinary meaning that will produce harmony is to be given the
words, if they are reasonably capable of bearing that meaning.
5. If obscurity, ambiguity or disharmony cannot be resolved objectively
by reference to the intention of Parliament, the object of the Act or
the scheme of the Act, then a meaning that appears to be the most
reasonable may be selected. 2
A proper interpretation of section 135, then, must begin with an analysis of
the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words used. This is not difficult
to discern because the language used by the drafters of the section is clear
and unambiguous. A finer analysis is required, however, to understand the
context in which the words are used, and the scheme, object and intention
of Parliament in enacting the statute. These topics are discussed below.
21. Ibid, citing Stubart Investments Ltd v The Queen, [1984] 1 SCR 536 at 578 and numerous
subsequent cases.
22. SeeR vMclntosh, [1995] 1 SCR 686 atpara 21,citing Driedger, supra note 17 at 105.
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2. History and context of section 135
The NSCA is a very old statute with a long history, dating back to the very
origins of the business corporation in the common law world. 3 When first
enacted in 1900, it was an almost verbatim adoption of the then-modem
U.K. Companies Act, 1862,24 and since its enactment it has been subject
to infrequent amendment and limited modernization.25 Section 135 of the
NSCA was originally based on the analogous section 38 of the 1862 Act.
The 1862 Act represented the culmination of nearly two decades of
dramatic corporate law development and reform in the U.K., where prior to
1844, there was no system for incorporation by registration. Before 1844,
corporations could be created by a Crown Charter, which was virtually
impossible to get, or by an act of Parliament, which was only slightly
more accessible. The imperatives of business, however, were burgeoning
as a result of the industrial revolution, which had created demand for large
enterprise and correspondingly large accumulations of capital, as well as
the emergence of a new merchant class with capital to invest. In order to
assemble capital pools in this environment, joint stock partnerships with
transferrable shares were commonly used, and such partnerships were
typically referred to as "companies."
The liability of the investors in such unincorporated companies was
unlimited, but the risk associated with this unlimited liability was typically
minimized by contracts with major creditors that limited the creditors'
recourse to the assets of the business. The inefficiencies of such a system
were profound, but the profits they made possible presumably outweighed
the costs of such private ordering.
At the time, a number of select committees were struck to examine
whether the European limited partnership model should be implemented
in Britain, and a variety of views were heard on the issue, with the
majority of witnesses opposing a limited liability regime. The reports of
these Committees variously supported and opposed creating the limited
liability company.26 By the early 1840s, however, the collapse of a number
of speculative "bubbles" brought political pressure to bear on the matter
of the regulation of companies. More select committees were established.
The most influential of these, the Gladstone Committee on Joint Stock
23. The NSCA is one of the oldest general incorporation statutes still used in Canada today for
business incorporations. Only the Prince Edward Island Companies Act, RSPEI 1988, c C-14,
originally enacted in 1888 as The Prince Edw'ard Island Joint Stock Companies Act, SPEI 1888, c 14
(the only remaining letters patent general incorporation statute in Canada), pre-dates it.
24. Companies Act, 1862 (UK), 25 & 26 Vict, c 89 [1862 Act].
25. See Sarah P Bradley, Nova Scotia Companies Act & Commentary, 2014 (Markham: LexisNexis
Canada, 2013).
26. For example, the Select Committee on Partnerships of 1837.
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Companies, reported that fraud could be reduced through a system of
mandatory registration and reporting of prospectuses and audited accounts.
The Gladstone Committee also considered the issue of limited liability and
concluded that it was an unnecessary enticement for investors, which were
apparently considered abundant.
27
The result of the Gladstone Committee's work was the U.K. Joint
Stock Companies Act, 1844,28 which drew the first legislative distinction
between partnerships and companies. The 1844 Act provided for
registration of any company that met the registration requirements, and
required the registration of all partnerships with over 25 members and
freely transferable shares. There was no provision for limited liability.
The 1844 Act was introduced principally for the protection of the public,
and not for the advantage of the companies registered. However, in the
absence of a suitable regulatory framework, the Act was widely criticized
as ill-conceived and ineffective
9
.
2
At this point, registered companies remained more akin to partnerships
than corporations, and the system of liability of the members had not
changed from that of the partnership model. While the need for corporations
to carry out large infrastructure projects was accepted, the availability of
limited liability and other modem incidents of corporate personality to
regular commercial enterprises was the subject of significant public debate
in Britain.
Then, faced with pervasive private structuring of limited liability
through contract, and the acknowledgment by the U.K. courts in 1852 of
the efficacy of such private contractual limitations of liability, as well as
public pressure, the U.K. Parliament was forced to reconsider its position
respecting limited liability. As Gower observes, "public opinion began to
harden in favour of the extension of limited liability, particularly when the
slump of 1845-1848 drew poignant attention to the consequences of its
absence."3 In that era, the failure to pay debts was still considered a crime
punishable by imprisonment, and the conditions in debtors prisons were
notoriously harsh. This shift in public opinion, along with the relentless
pressures of industrialization and the public benefits of infrastructure
investment by private companies were politically compelling. It became
clear that growth could be advanced through private investment, and that
27. See Rob McQueen, A Social History of Company Law: Great Britain and the Australian
Colonies, 1854-1920 (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009).
28. Joint Stock Companies Act, 1844 (UK), 7 & 8 Vict, c 110 [1844 Act].
29. See McQueen, supra note 27 at 51.
30. LCB Gower, Gower's Principles of Modern Company Lmv, 5th ed (London, UK: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1992) at 41.
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such investment could be encouraged most effectively through limited
liability.
The Limited Liability Act, 1855 was a breakthrough that granted
limited liability to companies of more than 25 members (reduced to 7
in 1856).31 The 1855 Act was introduced in the House of Commons and
passed through the lower house relatively quickly, but was not favourably
received in the House of Lords-the controversial Act was only passed
following numerous protests and amendments.32 The Law Times
famously called the bill proposing the 1855 Act "[t]he Rogues' Charter."33
Nevertheless, the efficiencies were obvious. It was said at the time that
limited liability was introduced for the purpose of encouraging investment
by "[b]usy persons and 'those unaccustomed to business"' and "[to] foster
the alliance of 'science and ability with capital."' 34
The first winding-up statute in the U.K. was the Joint Stock
Companies Winding-Up Act, 1844,"5 enacted simultaneously with the first
incorporation statute, the 1844 Act. Over the next two decades in the U.K.,
both corporate law and insolvency law rapidly developed. A number of
winding-up statutes were enacted; others were repealed. The object of these
statutes was to provide for the orderly distribution of the assets of failed
companies, enforce contributions against such companies' shareholders
and other contributories, and enforce the rights of the contributories
among themselves. Before the enactment of the first incorporation and
insolvency statutes in 1844, the courts had great difficulty dealing with the
complexities of winding up the large unincorporated joint stock companies
of the day. Although the rights of creditors-could be enforced against the
assets of the company and the property of its shareholders, no court was
empowered to deal with the rights of the contributories among themselves,
or to oversee the orderly distribution of the company's assets to discharge
its liabilities. 36
31. Limited Liability Act, 1855 (UK), 18 & 19 Vict, c 133 [1855 Act].
32. See Bishop Carleton Hunt, The Development of the Business Corporation in England, 1800-
1867 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936).
33. Tony Orhnial, ed, Limited Liability and the Corporation (London,UK: Croom Helm, 1982) at
33.
34. Bishop C Hunt, "The Joint-Stock Company in England, 1830-1844" (1935) 43:3 J Political
Economy 331 at 355, 356.
35. Joint Stock Companies Winding-Up Act, 1844 (UK), 7 & 8 Vict, c 11I.
36. See Leonard Shelford, The Leav of Joint Stock Companies: Containing the Companies Act, 1862
and the Acts Incorporated Therewith: With Copious Notes of Cases Relative to Joint Stock Companies,
the Rules and Forms of the Court of Chancery in Proceedings Under the Above Act, and Forms of
Articles ofAssociation (London, UK: Butterworths, 1863) at 78.
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The statute on which the NSCA was originally based, the 1862 Act,37
consolidated the 1844 Act, the 1855 Act and all related winding up Acts,
and established a new regime of liability for all companies. The winding
up provisions of the 1862 Act and its predecessors were enacted not just
for winding up incorporated companies, but for all business enterprises
then active in the U.K., whether incorporated or not. Any partnership,
association, or company (except railway companies) with more than seven
members was required to be registered and could be wound up under the
1862 Act, with certain minor exceptions. Section 38, the predecessor to
section 135 of the NSCA dealing with the liability of members, however,
applied only to companies formed under the 1862 Act. 38
The 1862 Act established three categories of incorporated company:
the company limited by shares, the company limited by guarantee, and the
unlimited liability company.39 The NSCA wholly adopted these categories
when it was enacted in 1900. Crucially for the interpretation of section
135 of the NSCA, the new unlimited liability regime under the 1862 Act
was distinct from that which then existed for unincorporated joint stock
partnerships. For example, even in that early text, section 38 included
relief from liability for past members after one year and required winding
up before imposing liability. The 1862 Act did not merely codify the
existing law relating to unlimited liability of partners/co-venturers in a.
joint stock company, but rather, established three new liability regimes
for share-limited, guarantee-limited, and unlimited companies. This in
effect set out a new, comprehensive system of corporate organization, with
special provisions relating to limited liability, which at that point was still
a relatively controversial concept.
The 1862 Act was adopted nearly verbatim by the legislature of Nova
Scotia in 1900 and has remained fundamentally intact ever since. The
provisions of the current NSCA relating to the liability of shareholders in
the event of winding up are unchanged in any material respect.
Although the NSCA was based on the 1862 Act, the two differ
significantly with respect to winding up. The 1862 Act provides a
comprehensive regime for the winding up of both solvent and insolvent
companies. When the NSCA was enacted, however, insolvent winding up
was not possible under Nova Scotia law due to the constitutional division
of powers in Canada that gives the federal government jurisdiction over
37. 1862 Act, supra note 24.
38. Ibid, s 38.
39. Ibidss7-10.
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bankruptcy and insolvency,4" a jurisdiction which has been interpreted
broadly.4' As a result, when the NSCA was enacted, it included no provisions
relating to winding up. The winding up of solvent companies was dealt
with under the Nova Scotia Companies Winding Up Act,4 2 and corporate
insolvencies in Canada were administered under the federal Winding-up
Act,43 the predecessor to the federal Winding Up and Restructuring Act."
At that time, federal bankruptcy and restructuring statutes had not yet been
enacted, and there was no general bankruptcy law in force in Canada.45
Therefore, aside from the liability provisions set out in section 135, the
NSCA does not deal with the procedures or mechanisms of winding up,
which must take place under another statute. The statutes most commonly
used for this purpose today are the federal Bankruptcy and Insolvency
40. The division of powers in the Canadian Constitution allocates jurisdiction between the federal
government and the provinces in broad terms, which can result in apparently overlapping jurisdiction.
For example, "[b]ankruptcy and [i]nsolvency" fall under the federal legislative authority, while
"[p]roperty and [c]ivil [r]ights in the [p]rovince" are within the provincial jurisdiction: Constitution
Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, ss 91(21), 92(13), reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5.
Canadian courts resolve constitutional challenges to legislation that apparently overlaps with the
legislative authority of another level of government by considering the "pith and substance" of the
impugned legislation. If the principal purpose or pith and substance of the legislation falls within one
of the enumerated classes of subjects stipulated to be within the enacting jurisdiction's constitutional
powers, then it will be considered to be valid, whether or not it also incidentally affects a subject
matter assigned to the other jurisdiction.
41. In Sam Lvy & Asssociks v Anzo Mining Inc, 2001 SCC 92 at para 38, [2001] 3 SCR 978 [Sam
Levy], Binnie J, writing for the Supreme Court of Canada, observed:
It seems to me that the decided cases recognize that the word "Bankruptcy" in s. 91(21) of
the Constitution Act, 1867 must be given a broad scope if it is to accomplish its purpose.
Anything less would unnecessarily complicate and undermine the economical and
expeditious winding up of the bankrupt's affairs. Creation of a national jurisdiction in
bankruptcy would be of little utility if its exercise were continually frustrated by a pinched
and narrow construction of the constitutional head of power. The broad scope of authority
conferred on Parliament has been passed along to the bankruptcy court in s. 183(1) of the
Act, which corifers a correspondingly broad jurisdiction.
42. Companies Winding Up Act, RSNS, c 82 [CWUA].
43. Winding-up Act, RSC 1906, c 129, later RSC 1927, c 144. This federal statute was originally
enacted as An Act respecting Insolvent Banks, Insurance Companies, Loan Companies, Building
Societies, and Trading Corporations, SC 1882, c 23 and by 1906 was known as the Winding up Act.
Its name was changed in 1996 to the Winding-up and Restructuring Act pursuant to An Act to amend,
enact and repeal certain laws relating to financial institutions, SC 1996, c 6, which was assented to on
29 May 1996. For context and further discussion, see John Honsberger, "Bankruptcy Administration
in the United States and Canada" (1975) 63:6 Cal L Rev 1515 and Jacob S Ziegel, "Canada's Phased-
In Bankruptcy Law Reform" (1996) 70:4 Am Bank LJ 383.
44. Winding-up and Restructuring Act, RSC 1985, c W- I1 [WURA].
45. The Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) was first enacted in 1919 and was based on
the 1904 United Kingdom statute. The 1919 BIA focused on liquidation rather than reorganization.
The CCAA, supra note 14, focused principally on reorganization and was enacted in 1933 in response
to the grim economic conditions of the Great Depression.
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Act 46 and the CCAA, though winding up is also possible under the Nova
Scotia CWUA and the federal WURA.
3. Scheme, object and intention of section 135
Section 135 appears in part IV of the NSCA, which generally deals with
management and administration of Nova Scotia companies. In addition to
the liability of members on winding up set out in section 135, Part IV deals
with matters such as the calling of meetings, proxies, the appointment of
directors and auditors, and compromises and arrangements with creditors.
Section 135, like its predecessor section 38 of the 1862Act, establishes
a basis for contributory liability when a company is being wound up.
It does not provide any framework for winding up or otherwise deal in
any way with the mechanisms by which winding up may take place.
As discussed above, those matters have always been dealt with in other
statutes. However, the object and intention of section 135 is tied closely
to the object and intention of section 38 of the 1862 Act and the related
winding up provisions of that act.
In the early development of U.K. corporate law, the courts of the day
stated explicitly that the object of the winding-up Acts was to enable the
managers of joint-stock companies to wind up the affairs of the company
and to compel the shareholders to contribute, but not to alter the legal
rights or liabilities of anyone involved in the company.4" However, the
House of Lords subsequently made it clear that section 38 of the 1862
Act created new rights which did not exist before the passing of the 1862
Act, and rights and shareholder liabilities which did not exist until there
was a winding up. They were also clear that section 38 alone regulated
shareholders' liability as contributories.
41
In the 1915 case of Carson v. Montreal Trust Co.,49 the Nova Scotia
Supreme Court specifically discussed the object of winding up and
contemplated the analogous nature of the winding up provisions of the
1862 Act and the federal Winding-up Act. The Court said:
I think the first thing to be considered is what is the object of winding
up? The answer to this question is given in clear and direct language by
Jessel, M.R., in the case of In Re The International Pulp and Paper Co.,
3 Ch. D. 597, at 598. He says:
46. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3 [BIA].
47. See Re Great North of England Railay Company, Ex parte Carrick (1851), 20 LJ, Ch 670;
Beardshaw vLordLondesborough (1851), [18521 21 LJ, CP 17.
48. Webb v Whiffin (1872), LR 5 HL 711.
49. Carson v Montreal Trust Co (1915), 23 DLR 690 (NSSC).
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What is the object of winding up? It is to distribute the assets of
the company ratably amongst its creditors and enforce contributions
against its shareholders or contributories, and make them pay what
they are liable to pay with a view to liquidating the affairs of the
company. That is the object of the Act. How is that object effected?
By stopping all actions or suits brought against the company when
the winding up is commenced so as to compel creditors to come in
and share ratably.
These remarks were made with reference to the Companies Act, 1862,
but they apply with equal force to the Winding-up Act passed by the
Parliament of Canada."°
As described above, prior to the enactment of the 1844 Act and the Joint
Stock Companies Winding-Up Act, 1844, the vast majority of companies in
the U.K. were essentially large partnerships with partnership agreements
that facilitated the free transfer of shares. The winding up of such
partnerships was complex and taxed the resources of the courts, which
were ill-equipped to deal with the multitude of transactions and rights
created by such business entities. Before the 1844 statutes, the winding up
of such companies required a suit in chancery to which all shareholders
would have had to be joined, and the mechanism of bill and answer was
used to enforce creditors' rights."
The winding up provisions of the 1862 Act and its predecessors
were clearly intended to overcome this difficulty by providing an orderly
mechanism for the distribution of failed companies' assets among their
creditors, the enforcement of contributory liability, and the enforcement
of the rights of contributories among themselves. This introduced a new
regime for all business enterprises in the U.K. at that time, as evidenced
by the fact that the winding up provisions of the 1862 Act applied not only
to corporations formed under the Act, but also to any organizations with
seven or more members, including partnerships and associations.
For companies incorporated under the 1862 Act, however, the statute
also established a new regime of shareholder liability for corporate debts,
which Parliament enacted as a result of the extensive public debates of
the mid-1800s described above. This regime did not simply continue
the traditions of the past, but rather created an entirely new standard of
business liability which, in the words of Lord Caims in Webb v. Whiffin,
"entirely swept away" the old state of corporate creditor and shareholder
relationships.52
50. Ibid at 691-692.
51. See Shelford, supra note 36.
52. Webb v Whiffin, supra note 48 at 734.
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4. Section 135 establishes a closed system of shareholder liability
In the modem NSULC cases, the parent companies argued as a preliminary
matter that the eight enumerated qualifications of shareholder liability
set out in section 135 were not exclusive, and that further exceptions or
limitations of NSULC shareholder liability are possible or permissible
under the NSCA. They argued that courts interpreting the liability of
NSULC shareholders should not be constrained from finding or applying
other exceptions from liability, based on the principles of partnership
liability or equitable doctrines such as the rule against double proof.
The statutory language of section 135 and the history and context
described above, however, do not support the contention that the
qualifications of liability set out in section 135 are open to judicial
expansion. The plain language used in the section indicates clearly that
the enumerated exclusions from general liability are exclusive, and does
not leave open the possibility that other claims are available to relieve
shareholder liability under the section. If they were, the purpose of the
section, which as discussed above was to establish a new and specifically
tailored regime of contributory liability, would be undermined.
Although this specific question has never to my knowledge been tested
in the courts, based on the context, ordinary meaning, object and purpose
of section 135, it is clear that the section contemplates a closed system of
liability for members.
Canadian courts always have the jurisdiction to alter prescribed legal
outcomes in the interests of equity, but it is unusual for such jurisdiction
to be exercised in commercial cases, and such equitable interference is
virtually unheard of in the kind of complex commercial arrangements
between sophisticated parties that typify the modem NSULC cases.
5. A shareholder's guarantee does not preclude contributory liability
under section 135
In the modem NSULC cases arguments were also made that a shareholder's
guarantee of an NSULC's debt should preclude the NSULC from claiming
against its shareholder for contributory liability because of the functional
equivalence of the guarantee and the contributory liability. However,
numerous distinctions between the liability associated with a contractual
guarantee and the liability of an NSULC contributory undermine this
argument. There is also no basis for this argument in the statutory language
of section 135 or in its history and context, provided there is no ancillary
agreement with the debtholder that recourse would be had exclusively to
the guarantee, which would engage the exception found at clause 135(f),
discussed above.
88 The Dalhousie Law Journal
While liability under a guarantee is contractual in nature, contributory
liability is statutory and can only be derogated from in accordance with
the provisions of the statute. Clause 135(f) itself establishes the only
mechanism by which a contractual guarantee, or any other contract with a
creditor, can exclude contributory liability, and is engaged if the guarantee
provides explicitly that no recourse will be had to the guarantor in its
contributory capacity. Clause 135(f) itself would be superfluous. if the
existence of a guarantee itself were sufficient to relieve liability pursuant
to section 135.
Although in the modern wholly-owned NSULC context, a guarantee
claim and a contribution claim will both be paid by the same entity, they
are distinct in a number of respects that reinforce the view that they are
mutually exclusive and that the existence of one does not and ought not
diminish the legitimacy and potency of the other.
An important fundamental distinction is that the guarantee claim and
the contribution claim are paid to different creditors. In the guarantee
context, the creditor is the indenture trustee, representing the collective
interests of the debtholders. In the contribution context, the creditor
is the NSULC itself, possibly represented by its liquidator. In all of the
recent NSULC cases, the parent companies have resisted the contribution
claim by arguing that the liquidator of the NSULC is, in effect, also a
representative of the debtholders and that therefore the guarantee claim and
the contribution claim are, in substance if not in form, both made by the
same creditor. This assertion is important to the bankruptcy law arguments
discussed below, but is clearly false in the corporate law context.
It has been clear in the U.K. and Canada since before the NSCA was
enacted that money owed by contributories is owed to the company and
is not an obligation from the contributory to the company's creditors. In
Webb v. Whiffin, Lord Cairns observed:
Now, I ask the question, are the contributions to be made by the ex-
members the property of the company or are they not? Can it be
contended for a moment that they are not? Whose property are they,
if they are not the property of the company? Is there any thing in this
Act of Parliament which makes them the property of any other person
but the company? It appears to me, my Lords, beyond all doubt, that all
unpaid calls, whether from members or from ex-members, are part of the
property and the assets of the company.53
53. Webb v Whiffin, supra note 48 at 735. Cited with approval in Barneds Banking Co v Reynolds
(1878), 3 OAR 371 [Barned's Banking].
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Additionally, it is well settled by courts in the U.K. and Canada that the
liability of a contributory under the 1862 Act commences on the date of the
contract under which the contributory became a member of the company.
The debt of the contributory exists from the date they subscribe for or
purchase their shares, though the amount is contingent and the debt is not
payable until the call is made. Since this is the case, on the date the liability
commences, the liability of the contributory can only be to the company.54
In the 1878 case of Barned's Banking Co. v. Reynolds, the Ontario Court
of Appeal considered this issue in the context of section 38 of the 1862 Act
and stated:
Being a debt at that time, who was the creditor? Plainly no one but the
company, as no one else existed to whom it could be argued the debt
accrued. If it was originally a debt to the company, which accrued while
the company was solvent, though it did not become payable until the
call was made in the winding up proceedings, there has occurred no
process of novation by which it has become a debt to the liquidator, nor
has the corporate existence of the company ceased, nor any other event
happened to render it uncertain to whom the debt is due. The existence
of the debt being established, the right to bring an action to recover it
follows of course, unless restrained by some statutory bar.... The effect
of the call is, by sec. 38, to make the debt payable which already existed
as a debt.1
5
It is also important to note that in many cases, bondholders are not the
only creditors of an NSULC. There may be claims such as those made by
employee pension funds, taxation authorities, or other creditors that will
also benefit from a successful contribution claim. Although a circumstance
may arise where the bondholders are the only creditors of the NSULC, this
does not justify disregarding the reasoning of the body of law described
above, and cannot support the contention that the corporate personality of
the NSULC should be disregarded for that purpose.
In the early Supreme Court of Canada case, McKenzie v. Kittridge, the
Court considered the application of a statute that imposed joint and several
liability on shareholders until properly registered under the Act. The Court
observed that such liability was akin to a guarantee, and was distinct from
the obligations of the shareholder as contributory. 56
54. See, e.g., Ex parte Camvell (1864), 4 De G J & S 539 at 542 (Ch); In re China Steamship
Company (1869), LR 7 Eq 240 (Ch); Williams v Harding (1866), LR 1 HL 9; all cited with approval
in Barned's Banking, supra note 53.
55. Barned's Banking, supra note 53 at 387.
56. McKenzie vKittridge (1879), 4 SCR 368.
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There are numerous other distinctions between a guarantee claim and
a contribution claim that further demonstrate that the two should not be
conflated. For example, guarantee claims and contribution claims are each
triggered by a distinct event, and thus, one may be payable while the other
is not. A guarantee claim will be triggered by the events stipulated in the
guarantee itself, which may include various acts of insolvency or non-
performance, while the contribution claim exists from the time of the share
acquisition and is only payable upon the winding up of the NSULC, and
even then only if the company's assets are insufficient to pay its debts,
liabilities, and wind up expenses. Additionally, guarantee claims can be
made against the guarantor regardless of their status as a shareholder,
while contribution claims can only be made against current shareholders
or former shareholders within one year of their ceasing to be a shareholder.
On the basis of this analysis, it is plain that a shareholder's guarantee
of an NSULC's debt should not preclude its liability as a shareholder
under section 135 for any amounts unpaid on the debt in the event of a
winding up.
6. Partnership principles are not applicable to NSULCs contributory
liability
The parent companies in modem NSULC cases have argued that companies
under the NSCA evolved from and are therefore analogous to partnerships
and that the provisions of section 135 are essentially a codification of
the equitable doctrine of contribution, which provides that a debtor who
discharges a debt owed severally with others is entitled to the payment of
proportionate contribution from his co-debtors. 7
57. See Abakhan v Halpen, 2008 BCCA 29, [2008] 7 WWR 510 discussing the doctrine as codified
in section 34 of the British Columbia Lcav and Equity Act, RSBC 1996, c 253. This provision is similar
in content to section 43(7) of the Nova Scotia Judicature Act, RSNS 1989, c 240, which provides:
Every person who, being surety for the debt or duty of another or being liable with another
for any debt or duty, pays such debt or performs such duty, shall be entitled to have assigned
to him, or to a trustee for him, every judgment, specialty or other security which is held
by the creditor in respect of such debt or duty, whether such judgment, specialty or other
security is or is not deemed at law to be satisfied by the payment of the debt or performance
of the duty, and such person shall be entitled to stand in the place of the creditor and to
use all the remedies and, if need be, and upon a proper indemnity, use the name of the
creditor in any proceeding in order to obtain from the principal debtor, or any co-surety, co-
contractor or co-debtor, as the case may be, indemnification for the advances made and the
loss sustained by the person who has so paid such debt or performed such duty, and such
payment or performance so made by such surety shall not be a defence to such proceeding
by him, provided always, that no co-surety, co-contractor or co-debtor shall be entitled to
recover from any other co-surety, co-contractor or co-debtor, by the means aforesaid, more
than the just proportion to which, as between those parties themselves, such last mentioned
person is justly liable.
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Although it is historically accurate to observe that corporate law
in England evolved from the law that then applied to large commercial
partnerships, it is important to note that at the time of the enactment of the
1862 Act in the U.K., as discussed above, corporations were considered a
new and distinct form of business enterprise and they were approached as
such by the courts of the day. In Webb v. Whiffin, Lord Cairns stated:
It was always the habit in ordinary partnerships, and it was the habit in
previous Acts, or in almost all previous Acts of Parliament, to constitute
more or less of a direct relation between the creditor and the debtor,
between the creditor and the particular individual shareholder in the
company .... But by the Act of 1862 that state of things is entirely swept
away.58
Therefore, the argument that the liability of a member of a Nova Scotia
company is akin to that of a partner is an assertion that is only true at the most
superficial level: the liability in both cases may be described as "unlimited."
However, this analogy does not withstand deeper consideration. It is clear
that the nature of a partner's liability and a shareholder's liability are very
different. The persons to whom the resultant debt is owed are different, the
circumstances under which the obligation to pay is triggered are different,
and a further important distinction is that the obligation of a contributory
can be unilaterally terminated by the disposition of shares.
This is uncontroversial and has consistently been recognized by the
U.K. courts. In Burgess s Case, the U.K. Chancery Court observed:,
It has been decided by a series of decisions in the House of Lords,
commencing with Webb v. Whiffin, that the 38th section of the Companies
Act is not to be read otherwise than literally, and it is not to be read with
reference to the previous liabilities of the shareholders or by analogy
to the law of partnership whether of a limited or unlimited character,
but it is to be read as imposing new liabilities on the members of the
company-liabilities imposed and defined by that section. 9
The distinctions between an NSULC and a partnership therefore are
and always have been significant. Clearly, as an incorporated entity, an
NSULC has perpetual succession, as well as characteristics of personality
such as the ability to contract, own property, sue and be sued, and so forth
that are not possessed by a partnership. The shareholders of an NSULC
are not fiduciaries of one another as partners are. Furthermore, although
an unlimited liability company does not shield its shareholders from the
58. Webb v Whiffin, supra note 48 at 734.
59. Burgess's Case (1880), 15 Ch D 507 at 511 (Ch).
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company's liabilities, it benefits from asset partitioning such that the
company is protected from its shareholders' liabilities in a manner not
possible for a partnership. 60
It is clear, therefore, that although the legal relationships of NSULC
shareholders evolved from the concepts of partnership, and the liability of
both NSULC shareholders and partners are "unlimited," the regimes are
entirely distinct from one another and any'analogy between them should
be undertaken cautiously.
III. Winding up under the NSCA
In modem NSULC cases, the question has often arisen as to when,
specifically, in the convoluted procedural process of a large-scale
international insolvency case, the winding up of the NSULC subsidiary
has commenced. A great deal can hang on this question, particularly if
the quantum of the NSULC's assets or liabilities is in a state of flux, or
where issues arise relating to claim filing deadlines. The NSCA, however,
is silent on this question. Section 135 itself states only that members are
liable "[i]n the event of a company being Wound up." A fundamental issue
to be determined for the purpose of any claim for contribution, therefore,
is when in the history of a company's existence, or upon the occurrence of
what event, the liability imposed upon members by section 135 is engaged.
This question has not been considered by Nova Scotia courts, and
there are no Nova Scotia cases directly, or even tangentially, on point. The
NSCA provides no definition for "winding up," and does not stipulate any
particular process for winding up. This leaves open the question of when
and under what circumstances a company is "being wound up" for the
purposes of section 135.
Below, I examine this question in detail and demonstrate that winding
up is a process that can be commenced in many ways. Winding up is not
a specific event; rather, winding up for insolvent companies commences
upon public notice of the winding up. I also argue that winding up for
the purpose of the NSCA is not limited to proceedings under any specific
statute, need not take place in the jurisdiction of incorporation, and can be
commenced by a U.S. Chapter 11 filing.
1. Winding up is a process, not a specific event
"Winding up" is an expression that is used in many legal contexts. It
generally refers to the process of orderly, ratable distribution of the assets
60. For a discussion of the role of asset partitioning in organization law, see Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, "Organizational Law as Asset Partitioning" (2000) 44:46 European Economic Rev
807.
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of an entity among its creditors following the discontinuance of its normal
business and prior to its ultimate legal termination. Partnerships, trusts,
bankrupt estates and corporations may all be said to "wind up." 6'
Winding up, as used in section 135, is a term that is general in nature,
and does not refer to a specific legal procedure under a specific legislative
enactment. The NSCA clearly contemplates a number of different avenues
by which a winding up can take place, with processes that vary depending
on whether the company is solvent, and whether it is winding up voluntarily.
The use of the term winding up is gradually falling into disuse in
Canada, with most modem statutes using the more precise language
of liquidation and distribution instead. In some Canadian provincial
incorporation statutes, winding up is a term that is still used to specifically
refer to the process of voluntary and involuntary winding up of solvent
companies pursuant to the provincial incorporation statute.62 Under many
other provincial incorporation statutes however, the use of the term winding
up has been discontinued, with reference made instead to the processes of
liquidation and dissolution.
63
The NSCA consistently refers to the winding up of a company as a
process, rather than a specific point in time. In clause 135(a), for example,
"the commencement of [a] winding up" is referred to as the point in time
relevant to the determination of liability for a past member, but clearly
contemplates that the winding up will continue for some time after its
commencement. Similarly, the opening sentence of section 135 refers to
the "expenses of the winding up," '' which cannot be known until some
time later, implying that winding up is a process that takes place over a
period of time.
This interpretation of winding up is clearly consistent with the
practical requirements of businesspersons and their legal advisers seeking
to wind up a company. It is an event that by its nature cannot happen
instantaneously. Therefore, a winding up will commence at one point in
time and conclude at another, and is a process that will take some time to
occur. Throughout this period, the company is "being wound up."
61. Court discussions have reflected the general nature of the term. For example, in the Nova Scotia
case of Re Maple Leaf Fruit Co, [1949] 3 DLR 426 at 427 (NSSC) the Court referred to a winding up
under the federal Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, observing that "[iun the winding-up of the bankrupt
estate, the trustee was ready to pay to all persons whose claims were approved a dividend of 20%"
[emphasis added].
62. See, e.g., Part XVI of the Ontario Business Corporations Act, RSO 1990, c B-16.
63. For example, the British Columbia Business Corporations Act, SBC 2002, c 57 and the Alberta
Business Corporations Act, RSA 2000, c B-9.
64. NSCA, supra note 1, ss 135, (a).
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Contributories, such as the shareholders of an NSULC, are liable to
contribute to the company "an amount sufficient for payment of its debts
and liabilities and the costs, charges, and expenses of the winding up."65
This is an amount that is unlikely to be known at the commencement of the
winding up, but rather is a liability that is of indeterminate amount until
the assets and liabilities of the company and the costs of its winding up
are settled. This amount is not fixed at the commencement of the winding
up, but is likely to increase over the course of the winding up. Where
there is more than one contributory, then the determination of the rights
of the contributories as among themselves also cannot be known at the
commencement of a winding up. The determination of the liability of the
contributories of a company is a fundamental task that must be completed
during the winding up process.
The purpose of winding up of an insolvent company is to stop further
claims and compel creditors to come in and share ratably, and winding up
is a process that is defined and understood by its purpose and effect, rather
than by any specific statutory procedural requirements.
In a number of decisions, principally in relation to tax law, Canadian
courts have been willing to construe winding up quite broadly, under the
"substance over form" doctrine.
In Merritt v. MNR, the Exchequer Court considered the appeal of
a tax ruling.66 The appellant was a shareholder of a company that had
disposed of all its assets and undertakings as a going concern, including
its undistributed profits. The consideration to the shareholder was given as
cash and shares in the acquiring company. The tax authorities assessed the
shareholder for income tax purposes for her portion of the undistributed
income that the company had on hand when its property was distributed on
the discontinuance of its business, and she challenged this characterization.
The Court considered, inter alia, whether the company had engaged
in a "winding up, discontinuance or reorganization" of its business, and
expressed the view that there was probably a winding up but that in any
event there was a discontinuance of business in a real and commercial
sense and that it was immaterial whether that was brought about by a sale
or amalgamation. In discussing the preliminary issue of whether there had
been a winding up, the Court observed:
I entertain no difficulty over the construction to be given the words
"winding up, discontinuance or reorganization," as used in s. 19 (1) of the
65. Ibid, s 135.
66. Merritt v MNR, [1941] Ex CR 175 [Merritt, Exch C], rev'd on other grounds [1942] SCR 269
[Merritt, SCC].
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Act. In construing those words we must look at the substance and form
of what was done here. In the case In re South African Supply and Cold
Storage Company, Buckley J. had to consider whether or not there had
been a winding-up "for the purpose of reconstruction or amalgamation,"
and he said
"that neither the word reconstruction nor the word amalgamation
has any definite legal meaning. Each is a commercial and not a
legal term, and, even as a commercial term has no exact definite
meaning."
I think that would be equally true of the words of s. 19 (1) which I have
just mentioned. There was no "winding-up" of the Security Company by
a liquidator, but there was in fact, I think, a winding up of the business
of that company and I think the word "winding-up" may be given that
meaning here, although I need not definitely so decide .... There is,
therefore, no necessity for attempting any precise definition of the words
"winding up, discontinuance or reorganization." What was done with the
business of the Security Company fell somewhere within the meaning
and spirit of those words.67
The Supreme Court of Canada reversed the Exchequer Court's decision,
but on other grounds. On the winding up issue, the Supreme Court of
Canada stated:
It was first contended on behalf of the respondent that, within the
meaning of subsection 1 of section 19 of the Income War Tax. Act as
above enacted, there was no distribution of the property of the Loan
Company and no winding up, discontinuance or reorganization of its
business. The learned President decided against this contention and on
that point I agree with his statement of the facts and with his conclusions
and have nothing to add.68
The Supreme Court of Canada and the Tax Court of Canada have also
often characterized surplus stripping transactions as winding up.69
Although these are tax cases, and as such take a liberal, broad and
purposive approach to statutory construction,7" they demonstrate that the
term "winding up" is not a term of art in Canadian law, but rather refers
67. Merritt, Exch C, supra note 66 at 181-182.
68. Merritt, SCC, supra note 66 at 274.
69. Smythe v MNR, [ 1970] SCR 64, Geransky v The Queen, [2001] DTC 243 (TCC); RMM Canadian
Enterprises Inc v The Queen (1997), 97 DTC 302 (TCC). These cases typically involved a corporation
with a substantial surplus and the use of another corporation as a means of getting the surplus into the
hands of the shareholders.
70. For a summary of the law in this regard, see Glaxo Wellcome Inc v The Queen (1996), 96 DTC
1159 (TCC), aff'd (1998), DTC 6638 (FCA), leave to appeal to SCC refused, 26834 (10 December
1998).
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generally to a process of concluding the business affairs of a corporation
and distributing its assets ratably among those entitled to them.
2. Winding up for insolvent companies commences upon public notice
of the winding up
Historically, a compulsory winding up was said to date from the
presentation of the petition (typically a petition to the court by a creditor
or contributory), and a voluntary winding up was said to commence from
the date of the resolution authorizing it.
Nova Scotia's CWUA, which, as discussed above, applies only to
solvent companies, provides that:
A winding up shall be deemed to commence (a) in case of the passage
of a resolution authorizing the winding up, at the time of the passing of
such resolution; [or] (b) in case of the making of an order directing the
winding up, from the making of such order.71
The federal WURA stipulates that:
The winding-up of the business of a company shall be deemed to
commence at the time of the service of the notice of presentation of the
petition for winding up.72
Where a resolution for a voluntary winding up is followed by a compulsory
order, the voluntary winding up is superseded by the compulsory winding
up, and the winding up will date from the service of notice of presentation
of the petition, even though this is later than the commencement of the
voluntary winding up.73
These provisions are consistent with the objects and purposes of
winding up legislation, which relate principally to the protection of the
interests of the creditors and contributories of the company. With respect
to the voluntary winding up of a solvent company, the date upon which the
board of directors has resolved to wind up the company is appropriate, as it
signifies the date upon which the company has determined to discontinue
its business and wind up its affairs. Though the creditors of the company
have not yet been notified of the winding up, they are not prejudiced
because they will be paid in full in the course of the winding up process.
The considerations are different with respect to an insolvent company,
where at least some creditors will not be paid in full, and must be given
71. CWUA, supra note 42,. s 7.
72. WURA, supra note 44, s 5.
73. Re Taurine Co (1883), 25 Ch D 118 (CA), Cotton U, dissenting.
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fair notice that the company is commencing to wind up and that it is no
longer operating in the ordinary course.
Throughout the history of company law, courts have discussed the
commencement of winding up with reference to the specific provisions
of the relevant statute, but also in terms of the policy rationale for the
choice of a particular date. Winding up statutes all specify when a
winding up is deemed to commence, but courts have indicated flexibility
in this regard. For example, winding up statutes based on old U.K. Acts,
including those in Canada, typically provide that a winding up will
commence upon the service of the petition, but courts have held that the
practical commencement of the winding up is in fact upon the notice or
advertisement of the petition, and not the date of filing with the court. The
rationale for this is that it is on the date of the advertisement that there is
"notice to all the world" that the winding up could occur and creditors
should no longer be entitled to proceed as usual in their business dealings
with the company. In Emmerson ' Case, the Master of Rolls held that:
[T]he first appearance of the advertisement determines ipso facto the
position of all the parties, and that it must be treated as notice to all the
world... from the day on which the advertisement appears all' parties are
bound... [but] up to that time it is open to the parties to deal exactly as
if the company were not about to be wound up, assuming, of course, the
transaction to be perfectly bonafide in the strictest sense of the term.7 4
It is important to note that the notice of the petition serves only to advise
interested parties that a hearing will be scheduled to determine whether
the petition for winding up will be granted or denied-the actual winding
up of the company is not inevitable on the date of the notice, but rather is
a potentiality. Nevertheless, creditors are expected to heed this potential
outcome and if they choose to continue to deal with the company, they are
presumed to understand the consequences of doing so.75
3. Winding up for the purpose of the NSCA is not limited to
proceedings under any specific statute
As discussed above, "winding up" is not a term of art, but rather is a
process that is understood by its substance. As such, winding up of an
NSCA company does not need to take place under a statute that uses the
language of winding up specifically and section 135 of the NSCA does
74. Emmersons Case (1866), LR 2 Eq 231 at 233 (Ch).
75. For example, see Roman Catholic Episcopal Corp of the Diocese of London v Home Bank of
Canada (Liquidator o) (1925), 7 CBR 223 (Ont SC), holding that the date of commencement of the
winding up was the date of the notice of the presentation of the petition, and not the earlier date upon
which the bank had closed its doors, nor the later date upon which the petition was granted.
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not require a company to be wound up under the Nova Scotia CWUA, the
federal WURA, or any other particular statute. The NSCA itself contains
nothing to indicate that it refers only to proceedings under the CWUA or
the WURA, and such a limitation would be inconsistent with the context
and legislative intent of the Act.
It is evident that section 135 contemplates both solvent and insolvent
companies winding up, but that contributory liability for a company's
debts is an issue that will only be relevant in the winding up of an insolvent
company. .As discussed above, the Canadian Constitution mandates that
matters of bankruptcy and insolvency fall within the exclusive legislative
authority of the federal government, and therefore cannot be addressed
through provincial legislation.76 This clearly means that NSCA companies
cannot be required to wind up under the CWUA, and winding up in other
statutes must have been contemplated from the outset.
In the past, it has been suggested that because calls on shareholders
to contribute to the assets of the company are considered property of the
company, any company should be considered solvent if it has contributories
with sufficient assets to pay its liabilities. However, the courts have not
supported this view. In a case from British Columbia, which at the time
had a system of corporate law very similar to Nova Scotia's, the British
Columbia Supreme Court considered an application from an insolvent B.C.
company that sought to wind up voluntarily under the B.C. Companies
Act, with the principal member undertaking to pay all creditors. The
Court declined to allow such a winding up, and stated that insolvent B.C.
companies are obliged to wind up either by way of a petition in bankruptcy
or under the federal WURA. The Court observed that:
Over many years it has been the law in this Province that a company
cannot resolve to voluntarily wind itself up when it is insolvent: Re
Western Hemlock Products Ltd. Where a provincially incorporated
company is insolvent, the appropriate procedure to distribute its assets is
either by way of a petition in bankruptcy or a petition under the Federal
Winding-Up Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. W-10. Re: Cramp Steel Company
(Ltd.); Re B.C. Ironworks Co. Ltd.
The main reason for this is because provincial Companies Acts do not
contain any scheme whereby the priority of creditors is established.
Section 91(21) of the British North America Act, 1867 gives the
federal Parliament exclusive jurisdiction to legislate on "Bankruptcy
and Insolvency" and so determine the method of paying creditors of
insolvent companies. Provincial statutes relating to insolvency where
they conflict with federal legislation are ultra vires the power of a
76. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 40, s 91(21).
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provincial legislature: Re Wentworth Insurance Co.77
Though the WURA is the only federal statute that uses the specific
nomenclature of "winding up," it is unlikely and impracticable that a court
in Nova Scotia would insist upon its use for the purpose of winding up
a Nova Scotia company. Today, the BIA and the CCAA are the principal
bankruptcy and restructuring statutes used by Canadian business
corporations. The WURA has become antiquated since it was enacted
in the 1800s and has been modernized only with respect to financial
institutions and insurance companies, which are obliged to use it because
they are specifically excluded from both the BIA and CCAA. 78 Corporations
incorporated under the Canada Business Corporations Act are specifically
excluded from WURA, 79 and in recent years, there have been credible calls
for WURA's application to be limited exclusively to financial institutions.80
It is notable that in the excerpt from Tober Entreprises above, the British
Columbia Court recognized that the appropriate procedure for winding up
the insolvent B.C. company was either bankruptcy (under the BIA) or a
petition under the WURA.
Circumstances may also arise where winding up under the WURA
is impossible. For example, the BIA provides that once an assignment
has been filed or an application for bankruptcy has been made under the
BIA in respect of a corporation, the WURA no longer applies to it, and
any proceedings commenced under the WURA are deemed to abate.8'
Therefore, if a Nova Scotia company has made an assignment or filed an
application under the BIA, it is no longer possible for it to obtain a winding
77. Re Tober Enterprises Ltd(1980), 109 DLR(3d) 184 at 186 (BCSC) [Tober Enterprises] [citations
omitted].
78. Many Canadian corporations could initiate winding up proceedings under the federal Winding
Up and Restructuring Act but rarely do so (except where the WURA itself requires it or they are unable
to proceed under the more modem BIA and CCAA) because the Act is badly dated and expensive to
use. See Ziegel, supra note 43.
79. For example, see the Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44, s 3(3)(b). See also
DXAshe Holdings Ltd v Money s Mushrooms Ltd, 2003 BCSC 1146, 126 ACWS (3d) 55, clarifying
that this exclusion prevails over the more general wording of the WURA, which provides that it applies
"to all corporations incorporated by or under the authority of an Act of Parliament."
80. See Insolvency Institute of Canada, "The Winding-up and Restructuring Act: Recommendations
for Reform," (IIC, 14 June 2000), online: <www.insolvency.calen/iicresources/IICRecommendations_
Reform WURA 2000.pdf>.
81. SeeBIA, supranote46, s213:
If an application for a bankruptcy order or an assignment has been filed under this Act in
respect of a corporation, the Winding-up and Restructuring Act does not extend or apply
to that corporation, despite anything contained in that Act, and any proceedings that are
instituted under the Winding-up and Restructuring Act in respect of that corporation before
the application or assignment is filed under this Act shall abate subject to any disposition
of the costs of those proceedings to be made in the bankruptcy proceedings that the justice
of the case may require.
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up under the WURA. In such a case, the company could be dissolved and
its assets distributed under. the BIA, but it could not also be wound up
under the WURA. It would be an absurd result and clearly contrary to the
context and intention of the NSCA if a company dissolved under the BIA
was considered not to have been wound up and never able to wind up.
Therefore, winding up under statutes other than the WURA must have been
contemplated by the legislature.
It also should be observed that winding up is a process that is separate
and distinct from bankruptcy, and the filing of an assignment under the
BIA or any other bankruptcy statute is not necessary to commence a
winding up. Though the purposes and the ultimate results of an insolvent
winding up and a bankruptcy proceeding are similar,82 they are distinct,
the principal difference being that in a bankruptcy, the property of the
corporation vests in the bankruptcy trustee, while in a winding up, this
does not occur and the company continues to own its property. In several
cases, courts have specifically distinguished winding up from bankruptcy,
or decided cases where winding up is sought as an alternative to bankruptcy
proceedings, principally due to the distinction between the role of the
trustee in bankruptcy and the role of the liquidator in a winding up, which
is that of an agent or quasi-trustee.
Traditionally, in a winding up the liquidator will ostensibly act in the
name of the corporation being wound up and will exercise the powers of
the corporation's board of directors without actually acquiring an interest
in any of the corporation's property. By contrast, the authority of a trustee
in bankruptcy to deal with the property of the bankrupt is derived from the
fact that the bankrupt's property vests in the trustee by operation of law.
In the early case of Re Commonwealth Trust Co., the British Columbia
Supreme Court discussed this distinction in detail, observing:83
Partington v. Cushing deals with the difference between a proceeding
in bankruptcy and a winding-up under the Act. As to this I cite from the
judgment of Barker J .... as follows:
There is in reality but little analogy between a winding-up of a
82. Courts have recognized that insolvent winding up proceedings and bankruptcy proceedings,
while distinct, share the same purposes and serve the same interests. In Sam Ldvy, supra note 41 at
para 27, Binnie J, writing for the Supreme Court of Canada, applied the reasoning from a winding up
case to a bankruptcy case, observing:
Stewart was, as stated, a winding-up case, but the legislative policy in favour of "single
control" applies as well to bankruptcy. There is the same public interest in the expeditious,
efficient and economical clean-up of the aftermath of a financial collapse. Section 188(1)
ensures that orders made by a bankruptcy court sitting in one province can and will be
enforced across the country.
83. Re Commonwealth Trust Co (1971), 20 DLR (3d) 170 at 175 (BCSC) [citations omitted].
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company and a bankruptcy. The property of a bankrupt vests by
operation of law in his assignee; the title as well as the control
is completely divested from the one and vested in the other.
Nothing of the kind takes place in the case of a winding-up.
The title to the company's property remains in the company;
the control and management and disposal of it is taken from
the directors and placed in the liquidators, who simply are
officers of the Court-receivers and managers acting under
the direction of the Court for the purpose of closing up the
company's business, realizing its assets and making a legal
distribution of them among the creditors and shareholders. See
Gooch s Case; In re A nglo-Moravian Railway Company. Every
statutory power conferred upon the liquidators is given with a
view to the speedy, inexpensive and effectual accomplishment
of this object.
This brings me directly to the problem in the present case: the
divergence in view as to the duties of inspectors in a winding-
up. The most important consideration to -bear in mind is that in
a winding-up the liquidator, unlike a trustee in bankruptcy, has
sole responsibility, acting under the statute and on direction
of the Court, where necessary, to conduct the affairs of the
company to achieve final liquidation.
In the Nova Scotia case of Crowther v. Canadian Mercantile Insurance
Co., the Supreme Court held that the Crown was at liberty to pursue its
rights against a winding-up company's property and was therefore entitled
to priority, because "[i]t was a case of winding up, not of bankruptcy. The
property had not passed out of the Company. 8
4
These distinctions demonstrate that winding up is a process that does
not require bankruptcy, but is a distinct procedure, and that the filing of
an assignment under the BIA is therefore not necessary to commence a
winding up.
For these reasons, it is clear that section 135 of the NSCA does not
require that winding up take place under the CWUA, the WURA, the BIA
or any other particular statute. This is supported by the context of the Act,
its object and purpose, and the parliamentary intent behind it, as well as
the case law canvassed above.
4. Winding up need not take place in thejurisdiction of incorporation
Although foreign orders with respect to the capacity, powers and status of a
Nova Scotia company or directly dealing with the distribution of property
situate in Nova Scotia are outside the jurisdiction of a foreign court, the
commencement of a winding up can take place anywhere in the world.
84. Crowther v Canadian Mercantile Insurance Co (1958), 15 DLR (2d) 204 at 208 (NSSC).
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In Canada, winding up is not and never was understood to be a process
that must be commenced or otherwise take place in the jurisdiction of
incorporation. Canadian courts have long been willing to commence the
winding up of foreign corporations, and Canadian bankruptcy and winding
up statutes clearly contemplate the recognition of foreign proceedings.
Both the BIA and the CCAA contain explicit provisions for the recognition
of foreign proceedings,85 and the federal WURA specifically states that it
applies to all corporations incorporated by Parliament and the provinces,
as well as "incorporated trading companies doing business in Canada,
wherever incorporated."86 This provision was enacted in the late 1880s
and was held by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1890 to be intra vires
Parliament.8
From these earliest cases, it was clear that a winding up could
be initiated in a foreign jurisdiction and could take place in multiple
jurisdictions simultaneously. In the 1890 case of Allen v. Hanson, Ritchie
C.J., speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, made
several observations relating to the constitutionality of the federal
WURA's application to foreign companies, the practical necessity of such
provisions, and the jurisdictional limitations of winding up orders made
with respect to foreign corporations:
[S]urely it must be said that the Dominion Parliament can in its right to
legislate in reference to bankruptcy and insolvency, legislate respecting
insolvent companies doing business in Canada, and with reference to
property of such companies within its jurisdiction.
Inasmuch then as the Dominion statute declares that the winding-up act
now applies to all companies which are doing business in Canada and
no matter where incorporated, there can be no doubt of the intention of
Parliament to apply the winding-up act to foreign as well as domestic
incorporated companies, and as I think such an enactment is within the
legislative power of the Dominion Parliament, and it being admitted
that this company was carrying on its business, and held valuable lands
in Canada, and was insolvent, and as the provisions of the English
Companies Act, 1862, are held to apply to foreign companies carrying
on business in England and are worked out as nearly as may be, or left
not worked out as the exigencies of the case dealt with require; and
inasmuch as the greater part of the assets of this company would seem
to be in Canada, there is the more reason why the property within the
territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the courts of Canada should be
dealt with under the provisions of the Canadian act; in fact it is difficult to
85. See BIA, supra note 46, ss 267-284 and CCAA, supra note 14, ss 46-5 1.
86. WURA, supra note 44, s 6.
87. Allen v Hanson (1890), 18 SCR 667.
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see how such property could be dealt with by the English liquidators; and
inasmuch as in this case it appears the liquidators under the English Act
are acting in concert with the liquidators under the Canadian act, I can
see no reason for supposing that any conflict can possibly arise whereby
this stockholder can be in any way damnified; on the contrary, it appears
to me that this is the most satisfactory way by which the company can be
wound up and its assets realized for the benefit of the company and all
the parties interested."8
The Supreme Court of Canada had no difficulty reaching the conclusion
that the inability of Canadian courts to fully exercise all of the powers
under the WURA with respect to foreign corporations was not a barrier to
the winding up of foreign companies under the Canadian statute. Patterson
J. observed:
It is true that our courts cannot exercise with regard to an English
company the full extent of the powers conferred by our Winding-up Act.
For example, they cannot, by the effect of a winding-up order, affect the
operations of the company in England, causing it to cease to carry on its
business there, as under section 15 the company must do in this country.
But the same difficulty was presented when the English courts were
asked to make orders to wind up colonial companies, and was held not
to affect the jurisdiction. See particularly the observations of Mr. Justice
Kay in re Matheson Brothers and of Mr. Justice North in re Commercial
Bank of South Australia.
The fallacy in this particular may perhaps have been contributed to by an
idea that an order called a Winding-up order, made in pursuance of an act
called a Winding-up Act, must be inoperative if, in its potential effect, it
must stop short of winding up or dissolving the company.
The expression usually employed in our statute is "winding up the
business of the company," though the phrase "the winding up of the
company," is sometimes used, as e g. in section 42 (6). The terms are
convertible, and the former readily adapts itself to the operation of the
order now in question, which is to wind up the business carried on by
the company in Canada, though our courts may be as powerless as the
English courts find themselves in dealing with colonial companies, to
dissolve the corporation or to administer the assets that are beyond the
territorial limits of their jurisdiction.89
The Supreme Court's position on permitting foreign companies to
be wound up under the WURA was consistent with that of the courts of
88. Ibid at 672-673 [emphasis added].
89. Ibid at 683-684.
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England at the time, which regularly ordered the winding up of colonial
companies.90
Where Canadian courts have refused to grant petitions for foreign
companies, it has generally been because such winding up orders have
been deemed impractical or otherwise inappropriate in the circumstances
of the case. For example, in Re Halifax Sugar Refinery Co., the Nova
Scotia Court of Appeal refused to grant a petition in a case where English
proceedings were already in progress because it determined that the
petitioner, who had already made his claim in the U.K. courts, had little to
gain from the ancillary proceeding and that to grant the petition would add
only to the costs of the winding up. 9'
5. Winding up of an NSULC can be commenced by a U.S. Chapter ]]
filing
Based on the foregoing analysis, a filing in a U.S. Chapter I I claim would
be considered to be equivalent to the filing of a petition for winding up if
by its terms it serves as a public notice that the liquidation of the NSULC
is potentially imminent. From the date of filing, creditors have notice that
the affairs of the NSULC will, if the court so orders, be wound up and
they are no longer free to deal with the company as if such notice had not
occurred.
It would be contrary to the purpose and policy that underlies winding-
up legislation for a Canadian court to hold that such a filing was insufficient
to commence a winding up, because to do so would entitle the company's
creditors to continue to deal with the company in the normal course, after
it has taken an explicit and legally effectual action to wind up.
It should be noted that although a Chapter 11 filing would be sufficient
to commence a winding up of an NSULC for the purposes of the NSCA,
Canadian courts have occasionally been unwilling to recognize the orders
of U.S. bankruptcy courts respecting Canadian subsidiaries, particularly
where the Canadian subsidiary is solvent. For example, in Re Singer
Sewing Machine Co. of Canada Ltd.92 the Alberta Registrar refused
to recognize the U.S. Chapter 11 proceedings in respect of a Canadian
affiliate on the basis that the Canadian company was not insolvent and the
U.S. bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction. The approach in Singer has not
been followed, however, and in the same year in Re Babcock & Wilcox
90. See In re Union Bank of Calcutta (1850), 3 De G & Sm 253 (Ch); In re Commercial Bank of
India (1868), LR 6 Eq 517 (Ch); In re Commercial Bank of South Australia (1886), 33 Ch D 174
(Ch); In re Matheson Brothers Ltd (1884), 27 Ch D 225 (Ch). See also Merchants 'Bank of Halifax v
Gillespie (1885), 10 SCR 312.
91. Re Halifax Sugar Refinery Co Ltd (1889), 22 NSR 71 (SC).
92. Re Singer Sewing Machine Co of Canada Ltd, 2000 ABQB 116, [2000] 5 WWR 598 [Singer].
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Canada Ltd., the Ontario court recognized a Chapter 11 proceeding of
a U.S. parent of a solvent Canadian corporation as a foreign proceeding
for the purposes of the CCAA. 9 3 Any uncertainty in this regard has been
largely resolved by amendments to the BIA and CCAA proclaimed in 2009,
which provide comprehensively for the recognition of foreign insolvency
proceedings under both statutes and are based on the UNCITRAL Model
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, resulting in provisions quite similar to
Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
IV. Bankruptcy law issues
In addition to the corporate law issues discussed above, the parent
companies and the parent company creditors in the recent NSULC cases
have also argued that the guarantee claims and contribution claims cannot
both be allowed because they are duplicative under bankruptcy law, and
are therefore prohibited by the rule against double proof in Canada and the
single satisfaction rule in the U.S.
In the double proof and single satisfaction rules, a tension arises
between two foundational principles of law: respect for the existence of
separate corporate entities on one hand, and the overarching ethic of pari
passu distribution of assets on the other. These venerable legal principles
are inevitably argued vociferously in cases such as these, but one must
give way to the other for the duplication arguments to be resolved. If
distinct corporate personality is to be recognized, then clearly obligations
owed to two distinct corporations must be considered separate debts and
not duplicative; but if the principle of pari passu distribution is to be given
meaning in the modem business context, the substance of the transaction
must be examined-and courts have recognized that the mere interposition
of a corporate entity in a transaction that otherwise would be-duplicative
cannot be determinative of the application of the doctrine.
1. Jurisdiction: Does US. or Canadian bankruptcy law apply?
A primary question to be considered is the jurisdiction whose laws will
govern the question of duplicativeness. Both Canadian and U.S. bankruptcy
laws prohibit duplicative claims in order to ensure pari passu distribution
and the fair treatment of creditors, but the nature of these prohibitions and
the legal tests employed are different in each country, which magnifies the
importance of the jurisdiction question.
In the modem NSULC cases, the most significant bankruptcies have
been those of the U.S. parent companies, because that has been the locus
of the bulk of the assets. The related bankruptcies and restructurings of
93. Re Babcock & Wilcox Canada Ltd (2000), 5 BLR (3d) 75 (Ont Sup Ct).
106 The Dalhousie Law Journal
various subsidiary companies have been less important to the vital issue of
asset distribution among the creditors, and the bankruptcy or restructuring
of some subsidiary entities has not been necessary at all. As described
above, however, in order for a contribution claim to be made by an
NSULC, it must have commenced winding up.
Where the NSULC is wound up in Canada, or proceedings under the
BIA or CCAA are commenced, Canadian law will apply to the winding
up of the NSULC, and the law of the jurisdiction governing the parent
company's bankruptcy-typically the United States-will apply to the
parent company. Bankruptcy courts in both countries are accustomed to
international bankruptcies and the principles of international comity will
generally incline them to show deference and respect for one another's
orders and determinations. 94 However, where a guarantee claim and a
contribution claim are made in the modern NSULC context, the question
of whether the claims are duplicative will be determined first under the
principles of U.S. bankruptcy law, because both claims are against the
assets of the U.S. parent: the guarantee claim will be made by the indenture
trustees and the contribution claim will be asserted by the representative of
the NSULC, both directly against the estate of the parent. If the NSULC is
successful in -its claims and is being wound up under Canadian law, then
Canadian law will be relevant to the distribution of the assets it recovers
from its parent company.
This provides the potential opportunity for the argument against
double proof and single satisfaction to be made in both jurisdictions, but
in most cases, the primary determination of the U.S. bankruptcy courts
will be pivotal. This is because not only must the determination under
U.S. law occur before the application of Canadian law is relevant, but the
arguments that the claims are duplicative will principally be made by the
parent company's other creditors, who will naturally only be interested
in the U.S. bankruptcy proceedings. Any other creditors that the NSULC
may have will stand to benefit from the contribution claim along with
the noteholders and so would not be inclined to argue against the claim
under Canadian law. The application of the Canadian rule against double
proof, therefore, will be secondary to the application of the U.S. single
satisfaction rule in the context of most modern NSULC structures.
94. For discussion see Holt Cargo Systems Inc v ABC Containerline NV (Trustees o), 2001 SCC 90
at para 68, [2001] 3 SCR 907.
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2. U.S. Law: The single satisfaction rule and the doctrine of equitable
consolidation
It is a general rule of law in the United States that a claimant can only
recover once on account of any claim. This principle is known as the rule
against duplicative claims, or the "single satisfaction" rule. There are
many circumstances, however, in which multiple claims will be allowed
in respect of similar or related obligations.
As a preliminary observation, it is clear that a single creditor can hold
multiple debtors liable for the same obligation pursuant to transactions
involving guarantees or joint and several liability. Generally, in such cases
the creditors' claims can be asserted in their full amount against each
debtor and not reduced by amounts received from other debtors, until the
creditor is paid in full, though it is clear that no creditor may recover more
than the full amount owed to that creditor.95
U.S. courts will also usually allow claims that have been partially
paid by other means to be claimed in their full amount against a bankrupt
estate, provided the creditor does not recover more than 100 per cent,
allowing a creditor to assert multiple claims and obtain closer to 100
per cent recovery than it would otherwise receive. In the 1935 Ivanhoe
Building case, for example, the Supreme Court allowed a creditor who
had already foreclosed on third-party collateral to assert the full amount
of its claim against a debtor.96 The Court allowed the claim to be made in
its full amount in order to preserve the amount that the creditor would be
entitled to in the distribution from the debtor's estate, with the caveat that
the creditor could not receive more than 100 per cent recovery on its claim.
Ivanhoe Building has been followed in numerous other U.S. cases to allow
the holders of guaranteed debts to assert the full value of their claims upon
the bankruptcy of the principal debtor despite having recovered partial
payment from guarantors.97
The modem NSULC cases, however, involve multiple claims
against a single debtor's estate. The holders of the guarantee claims and
the contribution claims have taken the position that because each claim
involves a separate creditor (the indenture trustee and the NSULC or its
liquidator, respectively), the claims should be recognized as distinct and
allowable. The parent companies and their other creditors have resisted
this characterization, and argued instead that both claims are for the benefit
of the same creditor, in substance though not in form.
95. See, e.g., In re Gessin, 668 F (2d) 1105 (9th Cir 1982).
96. Ivanhoe Building & Loan Ass'n of Newark, NJv Orr, 295 US 243 (1935) [Ivanhoe Building].
97. See, e.g., In re National Energy & Gas Transmission, Inc, 492 F (3d) 297 (4th Cir 2007).
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U.S. courts have allowed claims asserted by separate creditors arising
from a single transaction. In Delta Air Lines, for example, the claims made
by two groups of creditors in relation to the same underlying facts were
found not duplicative because each claim arose pursuant to a separate
legal obligation and the total recovery would not exceed 100 per cent.98
The Court stated that such claims will be allowed in full against the debtor
where they "arise under agreements (1) between different parties, (2)
addressing different events, and (3) providing for different remedies." The
Court rejected the proposition that "a single loss can only give rise to a
single claim in bankruptcy."
99
If the Delta Air Lines test is applied in the modem NSULC context,
the bondholders are in a position to make a strong argument because:
(1) the parties are different: the indenture trustee for the guarantee
claim and the NSULC for the contribution claim;
(2) the events are different: the default of the primary debtor for
the guarantee claim and the winding up of the NSULC for the
contribution claim; and
(3) the remedies are different: the remedy is contractual for the
guarantee claim and statutory for the contribution claim.
So-called "double dip" scenarios are not unusual in U.S. bankruptcies,
and often arise where the primary debtor has an independent claim against
another entity, the recovery of which will benefit all of the primary
debtor's creditors. Such an incremental claim may arise from a number
of circumstances, such as an intercompany loan or a fraudulent transfer
claim. Such cases are similar to the modem NSULC contribution claims,
in that the creditors in these cases will seek to recover from the guarantor,
and then also compel the primary debtor to recover its intercompany
loan or fraudulent transfer from its related company. Where the related
company and guarantor are the same entity, this creates the potential for an
allowable double recovery against a single debtor, which will be capped at
the full recovery of the debt obligation.00
A prominent recent example of such a "double recovery" claim arose in
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.,'0° where creditors with
$34.5 billion in claims against a Dutch subsidiary filed guarantee claims
98. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co v Delta Air Lines Inc, 608 F (3d) 139 (2nd Cir 2010)
[Delta Air Lines].
99. Ibid at 149.
100. For a full discussion, see Mark P Kronfeld, "The Anatomy of a Double-Dip" (2012) 31:2 Am
Bankr Inst J 24.
101. In re 08-13555-jmp Lehman Brothers Holding Inc, 08-13555 (Bankr SDNY 2009), online:
<www.nysb.uscourts.gov>.
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against the parent company and also sought to recover the full value of their
claims from the parent company through the recovery of intercompany
loans to the Dutch subsidiary. Although the creditors originally filed claims
for two times the value of the underlying instruments, they later agreed
to a plan that allowed them approximately 1.77 times recovery."0 2 The
validity of the claims was not tested by the court; however, in approving
the settlement, the court observed that the reduced recovery appropriately
reflected the risk of a finding of substantive consolidation.103
Under U.S. bankruptcy law, substantive consolidation is an equitable
doctrine by which courts disregard the separate corporate entities in an
affiliated group of companies, merging their assets and liabilities into a
single estate. This makes the creditors of each of the various entities in
the corporate group joint creditors of the new consolidated estate, rather
than the separate estates of each of the once-separate companies. Another
important consequence is that intercompany claims among the debtor
companies are eliminated. 0 4 These and other results associated with
substantive consolidation can have dramatic impacts on the rights of the
companies' creditors and as such, U.S. bankruptcy courts have stated that
102. Although multiple claims were allowed in respect of these underlying instruments, actual
recovery from the distribution of assets remained capped at 100 per cent of the value of the instruments.
In the final result, certain creditor groups of Lehman Brothers' 23 operating companies had recovery
rates of 100 per cent, while others saw recovery of 30 per cent or less. See Michael Fleming & Asani
Sarkar, "The Failure Resolution of Lehman Brothers" (2014) 20:2 Economic Policy Rev 175.
103. See In re 08-13555-jmp Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc, 08-13555 (Bankr SDNY 2009) (Order
Confirming Modified Third Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc and
its Affiliated Debtors, Doc 23023 filed 6 December 2011) at 13-14, online: SEC <www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/806085/000119312511339839/d267202dex22.htm>, stating:
The Debtors and the Creditors' Committee have conducted a thorough factual and legal
analysis to determine whether the substantive consolidation of the Debtors and their
Affiliates is appropriate. The facts and analysis set forth in the Disclosure Statement,
the Debtors' Memorandum of Law In Support of the Global Settlement, and the Suckow
Declaration, reflect that there are facts that support and facts that militate against the
substantive consolidation of the Debtors and their Affiliates based upon the law in this
jurisdiction. There is a possibility that if litigated to final judgment, a court may find that
the substantive consolidation of the Debtors and their affiliates, including their Foreign
Affiliates, is appropriate.
The Global Settlement gives due consideration to the strengths and weaknesses of potential
arguments that have been made for and against substantive consolidation. Litigation
regarding substantive consolidation of the Debtors would require vast amounts of discovery
and investigation into the operations of Lehman prior to the Commencement Date, would
be extraordinarily complex and costly for all parties involved, and would significantly
delay Distributions to all Creditors.
104. See J Stephen Gilbert, "Substantive Consolidation in Bankruptcy: A Primer" (1990) 43:1 Vand L
Rev 207.
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it is an "extraordinary remedy" to be used "sparingly,"'' 5 and the tests
imposed before employing it are difficult to meet. 106
In Owens Corning, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the
doctrine of substantive consolidation in detail and highlighted the Court's
reluctance to use equity to reverse bargains and guarantees lawfully
negotiated among commercial parties, and to treat parties as equal when
they had negotiated preferential treatment for themselves. The Court
observed:
Substantive consolidation at its core is equity. Its exercise must lead
to an equitable result. "Communizing" assets of affiliated companies
to one survivor to feed all creditors of all companies may to some be
equal (and hence equitable). But it is hardly so for those creditors who
have lawfully bargained prepetition for unequal treatment by obtaining
guarantees of separate entities. Accord Kheel, 369 F.2d at 848 (Friendly,
J., concurring) ("Equality among creditors who have lawfully bargained
for different treatment is not equity but its opposite").' 7
It is important to recognize that although claims for multiples of the
amount outstanding on the debt may be allowed in a U.S. bankruptcy,
recovery will be capped at 100 per cent. The additional claim or claims
serve only to increase the amount recoverable on the debt as compared to
other creditors who also share in the pari passu distribution of the parent
company's estate, but who do not have the benefit of multiple claims for
recovery.
The parent companies and their other creditors in the modem NSULC
cases have all resisted the contribution claims on the grounds that they are
duplicative of the guarantee claims. They argue that because the claims
arise from the same underlying transaction, and are both, in substance,
105. See In re Owens Corning, 419 F (3d) 195 at 208-209 (3rd Cir 2005) [In re Owens Corning], and
In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 483 BR 693 at 699-700 (Bankr ED Wis 2012).
106. US Courts have been inconsistent in their approach to substantive consolidation. Factors that
have been considered, though none are determinative, include:
I. The presence or absence of consolidated financial statements.
2. The unity of interests and ownership between various corporate entities.
3. The existence of parent and intercorporate guarantees on loans.
4. The degree of difficulty in segregating and ascertaining individual assets and liabilities.
5. The existence of transfers of assets without formal observance of corporate formalities.
6. The commingling of assets and business functions.
7. The profitability of consolidation at a single physical location.
These factors are often referred to as the " Vecco factors," referring to In re Vecco Const Industries Inc, 4
BR 407 at 410 (Bankr ED Va 1980). See Dennis J Connolly, John C Weitnauer & Jonathan T Edwards,
"Current Approaches to Substantive Consolidation: Owens Coming Revisited" [2009] Norton Annual
Survey Bankruptcy L 27 and Seth D Amera & Alan Kolod, "Substantive Consolidation: Getting Back
to Basics" (2006) 14:1 Am Bankr Inst L Rev 1.
107. Owens Corning, supra note 105 at 216.
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owed to the same creditor, they are duplicative and should not be allowed.
There are numerous U.S. cases in which duplicative claims have not been
allowed-for example, circumstances where individual claims were not
allowed because a union had filed a claim on behalf of all union members
that included the same loss,0 8 or where claims filed by a pension fund
for unpaid contributions were disallowed to the extent that other claims
relating to the same contributions were allowed.' 09
Determinations relating to duplicativeness, like determinations
relating to the appropriateness of substantive consolidation, are highly
fact-specific and U.S. courts have avoided bright-line tests when making
such determinations. The question of whether the NSULC liquidator is
in fact a separate creditor from the bondholders' indenture trustee will be
critical to the duplicativeness claim and the outcome is likely to turn on
the facts of each case. Although it is clear as a matter of corporate law
that the entities are separate, and that the nature of the obligations are
entirely distinct, it remains possible that the U.S. Bankruptcy Court could
be persuaded to view them as a single creditor, which would strengthen the
argument that the claims are duplicative.
One strong argument against the finding that the NSULC liquidator
and the indenture trustee are in substance representing the same creditor
exists if the NSULC has creditors other than the noteholders, as was
the case in some of the modem NSULC cases. Though the noteholders
held the overwhelming majority of the NSULCs' debts, other creditors
such as employee groups had also filed claims and would also realize an
incremental benefit from any recovery on the contribution claims.
Ultimately, NSULC bondholders in the modem context are in a strong
position in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court to resist arguments for substantive
consolidation and claims of duplicativeness and to see both the guarantee
claim and the contribution claims allowed as separate claims against the
parent company's estate, subject to a maximum recovery of 100 per cent.
It is unfortunate, however, that the U.S. courts have yet to consider the
question.
3. Canadian law: The rule against double proof and piercing the
corporate veil
Canadian law has evolved somewhat differently with respect to the
prohibition against duplicative claims, though there have been very few
108. See In re 05-1 7 930-alg NortInvest Airlines Corp, 05-17930, 2007 WL 2682129 (Bankr SDNY
2007); In re Ol-1603 4-ajg Enron Corp, 01-16034, 2006 WL 1030420 (Bankr SDNY 2006).
109. LTVCorp v Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp, 115 BR 760 (Bankr SDNY 1990), aff'd 130 BR 690
(SDNY 1991), vacated by agreement of the parties.
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cases considering the issue. The most recent case squarely dealing with the
rule against double proof is the 1998 Olympia & York case, in which the
determinative question was whether two claims were asserted "on account
of the same debt." 0
Olympia & York involved a wholly-owned finance subsidiary that
had borrowed approximately $2.5 billion through the issuance of notes
guaranteed by its parent. It then loaned these funds to its parent. Upon the
bankruptcy of both companies, the noteholders claimed against the estate
of the subsidiary as primary obligor and the parent company as guarantor
and the subsidiary claimed against the parent on its intercompany loan.
The noteholders were the only creditors of the subsidiary. The noteholders
and the trustee for the subsidiary argued that the debt of the parent to
the subsidiary on the intercompany loan was separate and distinct from
the parent company's liability on its guarantee and therefore both debts
should be allowed against the parent company's estate. The trustee of the
parent company resisted this, arguing that both loans arose from the same
transaction and related to the same underlying debt and were therefore
duplicative and violated the rule against double proof.
The trustee in bankruptcy for the parent company initially disallowed
the claims as duplicative, stating that although the claims of subsidiary
and the lenders were based on different instruments, they were in reality
the same debt. The trustee was willing to accept one of the claims against
the parent but not both. The trustee also determined that the amount of
the claim should be reduced by the amounts that the lenders had already
recovered on the debt from other sources of security.
The decision of the trustee of the parent company was appealed by the
lenders and the trustees of the subsidiary, and the Registrar in Bankruptcy
granted the appeals, finding that the claims were not duplicative because
a payment of one obligation would not reduce the other and the disregard
of the separate corporate entity of the subsidiary was inappropriate. The
Registrar cited with approval the English Barclays Bank"' case, where
Oliver L.J. suggested a test for determining whether the rule against double
proof had been contravened:
One has, as it seems to me, to look at the position at the point at which
the dividend is actually about to be paid and to ask the question then
whether two payments are being sought for a liability which if the
company were solvent, could be discharged as regards both claimants
by one payment."2
110. Re Olympia & York Developments Ltd (1998), 4 CBR (4th) 189 (Ont Ct J (Gen Div)) [Olympia
& York, Blair J], rev'g (1998), 3 CBR (4th) 304 (Ont Ct J (Gen Div)) [Olympia & York, Reg Ferron].
111. Barclays Bank Ltd v TOSG Trust Fund Ltd (1983), [1984] 1 All ER 628 (CA) [Barclays Bank].
112. Olympia & York, Reg Ferron, supra note 110 at para 11.
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The Registrar applied this rule and determined that because a payment
on the guarantee to the lenders would not reduce the intercompany loan,
nor vice versa, the rule against double proof was not violated unless the
separate corporate existence of the subsidiary were to be disregarded. On
the veil piercing question, the Registrar cited Re Polly Peck International
PLC which set a high bar for disregard of the corporate entity, quoting
from the earlier case of Adams v. Cape Industries PLC, to observe that,
"save in cases which turn on the wording of particular statutes or contracts
the court is not free to disregard the principal of Salomon v. Salomon & Co.
Ltd., merely because it considers that justice so requires.""' 3 On the basis
of this standard, the Registrar declined to pierce the veil and concluded
that the claims were distinct and did not violate the rule against double
proof.
The trustee of the parent company appealed the Registrar's decision
to the Bankruptcy Division of the Ontario Court of Justice, which
determined that the claims were duplicative. The Court echoed the
Registrar's framing of the fundamental issue, stating that, "'the question
[is] whether two payments are being sought for a liability which, if the
company were solvent, could be discharged as regards both claimants by
one payment.""' 4 However, the Court was willing to be more flexible on
the question of when it was appropriate to pierce the corporate veil in the
insolvency context:
Whether or not a "double proof' has been lodged with respect to what
is in substance the same debt is a matter to be determined on the facts
of each individual case. From my understanding of the authorities, the
underlying principles which should frame this analysis in group corporate
insolvency situations may be summarized as follows. First, where the
interests of different creditors of the various corporate entities come into
play, the courts should be careful to respect the axiom regarding separate
corporate existence enunciated by the House of Lords in Salomon v.
Salomon & Co. At the same time, however, the courts should strive to
give effect to the ethic of pari passu distribution and to the fundamental
underlying principle of justice as between all creditors. Balancing these
sometimes competing principles calls for a consideration of the true
nature of the transaction, and the relationship between, and the presumed
common intention of the parties. Finally, in seeking a just solution in
novel situations the court may engage in an analysis which, while not
ignoring the separate corporate being of the members of the corporate
group, nonetheless transcends the mere legal fact of that existence. See
in particular, as to the foregoing summary, Ford & Calter Ltd. v. Midland
113. Re Polly Peck International PLC (1995), [1996] 2 All ER 433 at 447 (ChD) [citations omitted].
114. Olympia & York, Blair J, supra note 110 at para 45, citing Barclays Bank, supra note 111.
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Bank Ltd. at p. 544; Polly Peck at pp. 444-445; and Barclays Bank Ltd. at
pp. 645 and 647-648, and at pp. 636 and 640.
In insolvency cases-as in, for example, tax cases-the court will not
allow technicalities to obscure the essence of the transaction. This
includes, in my opinion, not being either too dazzled or too immobilized
by intricate corporate footwork which is designed to accomplish
legitimate business and tax purposes, but which may not be as directly
dispositive in resolving insolvency cases."5
The Court went on to express the view that the Registrar's conclusions
regarding whether the loans were separate and distinct and whether the
corporate veil should be lifted were "mirror images of each other," and,
after examining the structure of the transactions closely, determined that
there was an "' inseparable nexus' between the obligation of the subsidiary
to pay the lenders and the obligation of the parent to make payments to
the subsidiary. The Court also assessed the intention of the parties and
determined that the parties intended that there would be a single U.S. $2.5
billion loan facility made available to the parent company and that the
lenders would look to the parent company ultimately and primarily, if not
solely, for payment. The Court found that the parties did not intend, in the
event of the bankruptcy of both the parent and the subsidiary, that they
would be able to recover a dividend based upon 200% of their claim. 116
In separate proceedings, Farley J. upheld the Trustee's decision that
the lenders were required to deduct the sums recovered on other security
from the amount of their claim, and this decision was upheld by the Ontario
Court of Appeal." 7
In my view, the result in Olympia & York is problematic. Although
Blair J. stressed that findings relating to double proof and disregard of the
corporate entity would be highly fact-specific, and observed that "courts
should be careful to respect the axiom regarding separate corporate
existence" and should strive to achieve the underlying objective of "justice
as between all creditors," he nevertheless arrived at a result that negated
the effects of the lawful, pre-bankruptcy bargain of the parties." 8 The
noteholders and the parent company in that case had lawfully negotiated
guarantees, presumably for their mutual benefit, that placed the noteholders
in a preferential position relative to other creditors and in the final result,
115. Olympia & York, BlairJ, supra note 110 at paras 27-28 [citations omitted].
116. Ibid at paras 33-35.
117. Olympia & York Developments Ltd (Trustee o] v National Bank of Canada (1998), 6 CBR (4th)
254 (Ont CA).
118. Olympia & York, Blair J, supra note 110 at para 27.
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they were relegated by the Court's decision to a position of equality with
those other creditors.
The Court in Olympia & York based its decision in part on its finding
that in the circumstances of the particular case, the parties intended that
they
would look to [the parent company] ultimately and primarily, if not
solely, for payment. It was not the common intention of the parties that
in the event of the bankruptcy of both [the parent and subsidiary], the
[noteholders] would be able to recover a dividend based upon 200% of
their claim. I9
As a result, the Court did not explicitly consider the issue of how the freely-
negotiated arrangements of different classes of creditors should influence
considerations of "justice as between all creditors," particularly in the
absence of inequitable or wrongful conduct. Rather, the Court examined
the specific contractual language used in the loan structures and found
an "inseparable legal nexus between the two loans in the structure of the
transaction" that justified disregard of the separate corporate entity of the
subsidiary. 120
Olympia & York is an important Canadian precedent relating to the
rule against double proof, and does bear some important similarities to
the typical fact patterns of modem NSULC cases. The case had a number
of unique elements, however, that are likely to limit its application to
future cases, and there are also some important distinctions that must
be considered in determining the application of the rule in the modem
NSULC context. For example, Olympia & York did not involve a statutory
contribution claim, but rather both claims were based on contracts
entered into contemporaneously with the underlying loan that explicitly
referenced one another. By contrast, in recent NSULC cases the second
claim is made by the subsidiary directly against its own parent company for
contribution, which is, as described above, 121 based on statutory liability to
the subsidiary that commenced on the date the parent company subscribed
for or purchased their shares.
It is clear that any determination regarding the rule against double proof
and the piercing of the corporate veil that is inherent in the application of
such a rule in this context will always turn on the facts of the particular
case. In any given case, the noteholders may be able to demonstrate that
the two obligations are sufficiently distinct that they are not "on account of
119. Ibidatpara 34.
120. Ibid at paras 27, 39.
121. See text accompanying note 50 above.
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the same debt," and future litigants may also be able to persuade the courts
to proceed cautiously when reallocating among creditors' rights that were
lawfully bargained for pre-bankruptcy.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have canvassed the major corporate and bankruptcy
law issues raised by a parent company insolvency in a typical modem
NSULC corporate structure. From the foregoing discussion and analysis
it is apparent that an NSULC can commence winding up through a U.S.
Chapter 11 filing and that typical NSULC financing structures can lead in
some cases to NSULC creditors having two allowable claims for recovery
against the parent's estate, subject to the caveat that they cannot recover
more than 100 per cent of the value of the underlying debt obligation.
This is the case because the obligation of the parent company to the
creditor as guarantor is separate and distinct from its obligation to the
NSULC as a contributory, and there is no basis in Nova Scotia corporate
law to diminish or eliminate contributory liability on the grounds that
the contributory has made a payment directly to the creditor in partial
satisfaction of a contractual guarantee.
Additionally, where the bankruptcy of the parent company is taking
place in the United States, the noteholders also have a strong basis on which
to resist arguments that their claims and those of the NSULC trustee are
unallowable because they are duplicative. The case law that has developed
around the single satisfaction rule in the U.S. has allowed double recovery
in circumstances very similar to the fact patterns presented by modem
NSULC cases, and although U.S. courts have yet to rule specifically on
the NSULC issue, they have repeatedly emphasized that the doctrine of
substantive consolidation is an extraordinary remedy that will be applied
sparingly.
In such cross-border insolvencies, U.S. bankruptcy law is likely to be
dispositive of the issues relating to whether the claims are duplicative, but
there may be circumstances where the Canadian approach is relevant. To
the extent that it is, there has thus far been only one Canadian case squarely
on point 122 and in that case, the Ontario Bankruptcy Court demonstrated a
more flexible approach than that typically seen in the U.S. and disallowed
claims on a guarantee and an intercompany loan as duplicative. The Court
made it clear however, that all determinations relating to the rule against
double proof would be highly fact specific and determined with due regard
for the importance of respect for the separate corporate entities involved
122. Olympia & York, Blair J, supra note 110.
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in the transactions. It is important to note, however, that this case dealt
with a contractual intercompany loan entered into contemporaneously
with the underlying debt obligation. As discussed above, a contribution
claim is distinguishable from such a loan in several meaningful respects
and therefore the question of whether a guarantee claim and a contribution
claim would. be considered duplicative in Canadian law is not yet settled.
It is the nature of business that financial disputes are usually settled
by the parties themselves once the strengths and weaknesses of their
relative positions are made sufficiently clear. Businesspeople and their
advisers are, by their nature and experience, skilled negotiators inclined
to pragmatism in such matters. The consequence of this is that many
questions of corporate law that arise in such disputes are not resolved with
the benefit of'judicial interpretation that would serve to guide future cases.
This is particularly true in jurisdictions such as Canada, where disputes
relating to the intricacies of corporate law are relatively rare to begin with.
Numerous recent U.S. cases have raised interesting and important issues
relating to the liability of the shareholders of an NSULC and the bankruptcy
law questions associated with insolvencies in modem NSULC corporate
structures, but unfortunately for those looking for judicial guidance on
these issues, all have settled before a judicial determination on the key
issues at stake. These cases have highlighted, however, the importance of
the issue and the gap in the existing literature and jurisprudence, and have
provided an interesting basis for closer examination.

